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Planned Obsolescence as an Incentive Device for Unobservable Quality

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  • Roland Strausz

Abstract

Stressing the multi-dimensional character of quality, I propose a new theory of planned obsolescence as an incentive device that benefits consumers. I argue that planned obsolescence increases the frequency of repurchases and, therefore, enables consumers to punish producers faster for a lack of overall quality. This strengthens the producers' incentives to provide adequate levels of quality. The theory implies a trade-off between a good's durability and its other unobservable quality attributes. This leads to an artificially high degree of obsolescence as compared to the first best where quality is observable. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009.

Suggested Citation

  • Roland Strausz, 2009. "Planned Obsolescence as an Incentive Device for Unobservable Quality," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(540), pages 1405-1421, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:119:y:2009:i:540:p:1405-1421
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    Cited by:

    1. Jong-Hee Hahn & Jin-Hyuk Kim, 2012. "Monopoly R&D and Compatibility Decisions in Network Industries," Working papers 2012rwp-43, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
    2. Ishikawa, Jota & Morita, Hodaka & Mukunoki, Hiroshi, 2020. "Parallel imports and repair services," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 137-160.
    3. Strausz, Roland, 2009. "Monopoly distortions in durability and multi-dimensional quality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 333-335, December.
    4. Hakenes, Hendrik & Katolnik, Svetlana, 2017. "On the incentive effects of job rotation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 424-441.
    5. Martin Paredes, 2015. "Brand Loyalty, Volume of Trade and Leapfrogging: Consumer Behavior in Markets of Durable Experience Goods," Working Papers 31, Peruvian Economic Association.
    6. Abraham L. Wickelgren, 2016. "An Economic Analysis of Arbitration versus Litigation for Contractual Disputes," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(2), pages 393-410.
    7. Massimiliano Borrello & Francesco Caracciolo & Alessia Lombardi & Stefano Pascucci & Luigi Cembalo, 2017. "Consumers’ Perspective on Circular Economy Strategy for Reducing Food Waste," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 9(1), pages 1-18, January.
    8. Autores varios, 2017. "Aproximaciones Jurídicas a la Obsolescencia Programada," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Derecho, number 912.
    9. Gaia Rubera, 2015. "Design Innovativeness and Product Sales' Evolution," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 34(1), pages 98-115, January.
    10. Thomas Siderius & Trevor Zink, 2023. "Markets and the Future of the Circular Economy," Circular Economy and Sustainability, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 1569-1595, September.
    11. Kuppelwieser, Volker G. & Klaus, Phil & Manthiou, Aikaterini & Boujena, Othman, 2019. "Consumer responses to planned obsolescence," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 157-165.

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