Understanding the evolution and performance of water markets and allocation policy: A transaction costs analysis framework
Water markets and associated allocation policy reforms have struggled to achieve their intended goals in many water-stressed rivers, in part due to the institutional friction imposed by transition and transaction costs. This paper elaborates a transaction costs analysis framework to examine the evolution and performance of water markets and allocation policy reforms. This analysis rests on three pillars: i) a synthesis of three theoretical traditions of institutional analysis (Williamson, North, and Ostrom) often considered independently; ii) a framework to examine the types and interactions of transaction costs in market-based water allocation over time; and iii) an illustrative analysis of three large river basins – the Colorado, Columbia and Murray–Darling – with varying levels of success in market-based water policy reforms. The resulting framework accounts for water's complexity as an economic good. This framework and the case studies lead to the identification of several policy implications including the need for: a multiphase sequencing of reform, strategic investment in institutional transition costs, and institutional choices that preserve future flexibility to adjust water rights and diversion limits to manage social and environmental externalities.
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