IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecanpo/v84y2024icp725-738.html

Farmers' decision-making regarding land under economic incentives: Evidence from rural China

Author

Listed:
  • Guangcai, Zhang
  • Shihu, Zhang
  • Tingyu, Zhu
  • Haiying, Gu

Abstract

To achieve complete urbanization in developing countries, it is essential for many farmers to leave rural areas and withdraw from farmland as they enter urban employment. The Chinese government offers economic incentives to encourage households to relinquish their land rights. Based on a survey data in rural China, this paper examines the impact of land transfers and urban housing on the withdrawal of contractual rights of farm households. Econometric analyses reveal that rural households with urban housing are 6.4 % less likely to choose to withdraw from land, whereas those involved in land transfers are 3.8 % more likely to do so. The study's findings suggest that a uniform policy, like nationwide land withdrawal reforms accompanied by economic compensation, might lead to outcomes where the poor lose land and the rich retain theirs.

Suggested Citation

  • Guangcai, Zhang & Shihu, Zhang & Tingyu, Zhu & Haiying, Gu, 2024. "Farmers' decision-making regarding land under economic incentives: Evidence from rural China," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 725-738.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecanpo:v:84:y:2024:i:c:p:725-738
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eap.2024.09.019
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0313592624002443
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.eap.2024.09.019?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lin, Justin Yifu, 1991. "The household responsibility system reform and the adoption of hybrid rice in China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 353-372, October.
    2. Mengling Tian & Yangyang Zheng, 2022. "How to Promote the Withdrawal of Rural Land Contract Rights? An Evolutionary Game Analysis Based on Prospect Theory," Land, MDPI, vol. 11(8), pages 1-27, July.
    3. Lin, Justin Yifu, 1992. "Rural Reforms and Agricultural Growth in China," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 34-51, March.
    4. Deininger, Klaus & Jin, Songqing, 2009. "Securing property rights in transition: Lessons from implementation of China's rural land contracting law," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 22-38, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Chao Yu & Zepeng Gong & Runqiu Liu, 2025. "Will policy target groups choose to withdraw from rural housing land? A survey in Chengdu, China," Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 12(1), pages 1-15, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Wang, Hui & Riedinger, Jeffrey & Jin, Songqing, 2015. "Land documents, tenure security and land rental development: Panel evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 220-235.
    2. Jia, Lili, 2012. "Land fragmentation and off-farm labor supply in China," Studies on the Agricultural and Food Sector in Transition Economies, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO), volume 66, number 66.
    3. Chen, Shuo & Lan, Xiaohuan, 2020. "Tractor vs. animal: Rural reforms and technology adoption in China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
    4. Kanbur, Ravi & Zhang, Xiaobo, 2001. "Fifty Years Of Regional Inequality In China: A Journey Through Revolution, Reform And Openness," Working Papers 7236, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
    5. repec:ehl:lserod:65369 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Jia, Lili & Petrick, Martin, 2014. "How does land fragmentation affect off-farm labor supply: panel data evidence from China," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 45(3), pages 369-380.
    7. Brockhaus, Jan & Huang, Jikun & Hu, Jiliang & Kalkuhl, Matthias & von Braun, Joachim & Yang, Guolei, "undated". "Rice, wheat, and corn supply response in China," 2015 AAEA & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, July 26-28, San Francisco, California 205988, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    8. Li, Yanjun & Bai, Yu & Nakabayashi, Masaki, 2025. "Land reform and illegal adoption of children," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 182-208.
    9. Xianlei Ma & Justus Wesseler & Nico Heerink & Futian Qu, 2013. "Land Tenure Reforms and Land Conservation Investments in China ¨C What Does Real Option Value Theory Tell Us?," Review of Economics & Finance, Better Advances Press, Canada, vol. 3, pages 19-33, August.
    10. Rozelle, Scott & Huang, Jikun, 2000. "Transition, development and the supply of wheat in China," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 44(4), pages 1-29.
    11. Du, Jane & Deng, Kent, 2016. "To get the prices right for food: a “Gerschenkron state” versus the market in reforming China, 1979–2006," Economic History Working Papers 65369, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
    12. Joshua Eisenman, 2018. "Commune Kabuki: Development and Productivity Growth under Maoist China's Rural Collectives," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 49(6), pages 1553-1579, November.
    13. Deininger, Klaus & Savastano, Sara & Carletto, Calogero, 2012. "Land Fragmentation, Cropland Abandonment, and Land Market Operation in Albania," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(10), pages 2108-2122.
    14. Hu, Zhi-An & Huang, Wei & Luo, Wei & You, Wuyue & Zhang, Chuanchuan, 2024. "The educational and labor market consequences of teenage exposure to rural land decollectivization in China," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 228(C).
    15. Zhanyu Dong & Zijia Chen & Junyou Chen & Guangjun Shen, 2026. "Unlocking Rural Entrepreneurship Through Rural Land Mortgage: Evidence From an Institutional Reform in China," Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 34(1), pages 137-160, January.
    16. Feng Deng, 2020. "Informality, informal institutions, and uneven land reform in China," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(4), pages 495-510, May.
    17. Cheng, Yifan & Yu, Jianyu & Min, Shi & Wang, Xiaobing, 2024. "The effects of land titling on intergenerational transfers in rural China," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 225(C), pages 228-251.
    18. Boberg-Fazlić, Nina & Lampe, Markus & Martinelli Lasheras, Pablo & Sharp, Paul, 2022. "Winners and losers from agrarian reform: Evidence from Danish land inequality 1682–1895," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 155(C).
    19. Chen, Shuo & Xie, Bin, 2025. "The abolition of People’s Communes and fertility decline in rural China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 172(C).
    20. Kym Anderson, 2018. "From taxing to subsidizing farmers in China post-1978," China Agricultural Economic Review, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 10(1), pages 36-47, February.
    21. Deininger, Klaus & Jin, Songqing & Xia, Fang & Huang, Jikun, 2014. "Moving Off the Farm: Land Institutions to Facilitate Structural Transformation and Agricultural Productivity Growth in China," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 505-520.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecanpo:v:84:y:2024:i:c:p:725-738. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/economic-analysis-and-policy .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.