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Complex dynamics of dual oligopoly demand uncertainty under carbon emission trading mechanism

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  • Liuwei, Zhao
  • Shuai, Jin
  • Hongyun, Jiang

Abstract

The international community's growing focus on energy conservation and emission reduction has led businesses to prioritize low-carbon operations and the marketing of environmentally friendly products during their production processes. On the one hand, with the reform of carbon emissions trading, carbon emission trading has become a potential profit point for enterprises. On the contrary, the consumer market is influenced by the uncertain external environment. And consumers' environmental awareness increases the uncertainty of product demand. Therefore, the intricate dynamics of dual oligopoly demand uncertainty within the framework of a carbon emission trading mechanism are explored in this scholarly analysis. The best market Porter's generic strategies, including emission reduction investment and product pricing how can carbon quotas, uncertainty in market demand, and consumer environmental preferences improve expected profits? The results show that technology emission reduction costs, carbon emission trading prices and consumer preferences for low-carbon products. It is an important factor that affects the competitive strategy of the two enterprises. The different values of the above factors will change the relative intensity of emission reduction investment and the relative profitability of the two. Complete company statement in a balanced state. This article also investigates the complexity of adjusting the dynamic evolution path of competitive strategies between two organizations. Feedback controllers can effectively suppress unstable equilibrium states and provide effective references for their stable operation.

Suggested Citation

  • Liuwei, Zhao & Shuai, Jin & Hongyun, Jiang, 2024. "Complex dynamics of dual oligopoly demand uncertainty under carbon emission trading mechanism," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:179:y:2024:i:c:s0960077923013371
    DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2023.114435
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    References listed on IDEAS

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