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Leaders’ capabilities and organizational efficiency: Evidence from the national taxation bureaucracy in China

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  • Zhang, Wenwen
  • Wan, Xin
  • Tian, Binbin

Abstract

Tax authority leaders have a significant impact on organizational efficiency, which is mainly manifested in tax collection efficiency. Based on provincial tax administrative data and data on listed companies from 1998 to 2017, we examine the impact of the capabilities of leaders of the National Taxation Bureaucracy (NTB) on tax collection efficiency. We adopt the fixed effects approach and isolate the individual effects of NTB directors as a proxy of leaders’ capabilities. We find that directors with stronger capabilities enhance tax revenue growth and complete tax revenue tasks by affecting corporate income taxes. The findings suggest that more capable directors are found to severely combat tax evasion and avoidance. Specifically, taxable income approved by the NTB, preferential tax policies and tax auditing have been used to combat tax evasion. We also clarify the boundaries of leaders’ capabilities. We provide supportive evidence for leaders’ individual impact on tax collection efficiency and enrich the study of tax collection and administration.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhang, Wenwen & Wan, Xin & Tian, Binbin, 2024. "Leaders’ capabilities and organizational efficiency: Evidence from the national taxation bureaucracy in China," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:asieco:v:95:y:2024:i:c:s1049007824000939
    DOI: 10.1016/j.asieco.2024.101798
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    References listed on IDEAS

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