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Mutual monitoring in a tradable water rights system: A case study of Zhangye City in Northwest China

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  • Zhang, Jun-Lian
  • Zhang, Feng-Rong

Abstract

Tradable water right systems are becoming important ways to achieve distributive efficiency in water resources. In 2002, China's Ministry of Water Resources initiated a pilot project in Zhangye City in Northwest China. The project was designed to establish a new water use rights system with tradable water quotas with the hope of reallocating water resources more efficiently through market-based instruments. However, the tradable water right system is not well enforced. Based on both primary and secondary data, we find that mutual monitoring can improve the effectiveness of a water allocation and trading program. For both surface water and groundwater irrigation systems, the conditions needed to stimulate mutual monitoring include: (1) a hierarchical management system; (2) well defined water rights or quotas; (3) control of total water quotas and water sources by the upper hierarchy; and (4) an approximate balance between the water supply or pumping capacity and the water quota. We describe also the institutional requirements for stimulating mutual monitoring.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhang, Jun-Lian & Zhang, Feng-Rong, 2008. "Mutual monitoring in a tradable water rights system: A case study of Zhangye City in Northwest China," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 95(3), pages 331-338, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:agiwat:v:95:y:2008:i:3:p:331-338
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Takahashi, Taro & Aizaki, Hideo & Ge, Yingchun & Ma, Mingguo & Nakashima, Yasuhiro & Sato, Takeshi & Wang, Weizhen & Yamada, Nanae, 2013. "Agricultural water trade under farmland fragmentation: A simulation analysis of an irrigation district in northwestern China," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 63-66.
    2. Hong, Yu & Berentsen, Paul & Heerink, Nico & Shi, Minjun & van der Werf, Wopke, 2019. "The future of intercropping under growing resource scarcity and declining grain prices - A model analysis based on a case study in Northwest China," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 176(C).
    3. Ye Sun & Tomohiro Akiyama, 2018. "An Empirical Study on Sustainable Agriculture Land Use Right Transfer in the Heihe River Basin," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-13, February.
    4. Chao Bao & Chuang-lin Fang, 2012. "Water Resources Flows Related to Urbanization in China: Challenges and Perspectives for Water Management and Urban Development," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 26(2), pages 531-552, January.
    5. de Bonviller, Simon & Wheeler, Sarah Ann & Zuo, Alec, 2020. "The dynamics of groundwater markets: Price leadership and groundwater demand elasticity in the Murrumbidgee, Australia," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 239(C).

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