Hybrid Cardinal Tournaments
This paper proposes an alternative to standard cardinal tournaments. The analysis contrasts "hybrid" cardinal tournaments to standard cardinal tournaments and piece rates. It shows that providing for partial insurance against common uncertainty via a hybrid tournament (in which the weights on absolute and group average performances are not equal) is always better for the principal than providing for full insurance against common uncertainty via a standard tournament (with equal weights), or than providing for no insurance at all via piece rates. Hybrid tournaments increase the principal's profit because the agents exert more effort in equilibrium.
Volume (Year): 30 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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- Perez-Castrillo, J David & Verdier, Thierry, 1992. "A General Analysis of Rent-Seeking Games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 335-350, April.