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On Cobb-Douglas Preferences in Bilateral Oligopoly

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  • Alex Dickson

Abstract

Bilateral oligopoly is a simple model of exchange in which a finite set of sellers seek to exchange the goods they are endowed with for money with a finite set of buyers, and no price-taking assumptions are imposed. If trade takes place via a strategic market game bilateral oligopoly can be thought of as two linked proportional-sharing contests: in one the sellers share the aggregate bid from the buyers in proportion to their supply and in the other the buyers share the aggregate supply in proportion to their bids. The analysis can be separated into two ?partial games?. First, fix the aggregate bid at B; in the first partial game the sellers contest this fixed prize in proportion to their supply and the aggregate supply in the equilibrium of this game is . Next, fix the aggregate supply at X; in the second partial game the buyers contest this fixed prize in proportion to their bids and the aggregate bid in the equilibrium of this game is . The analysis of these two partial games takes into account competition within each side of the market. Equilibrium in bilateral oligopoly must take into account competition between sellers and buyers and requires, for example, . When all traders have Cobb-Douglas preferences does not depend on B and does not depend on X: whilst there is competition within each side of the market there is no strategic interdependence between the sides of the market. The Cobb-Douglas assumption provides a tractable framework in which to explore the features of fully strategic trade but it misses perhaps the most interesting feature of bilateral oligopoly, the implications of which are investigated. JEL classification: C72; D43; D50.

Suggested Citation

  • Alex Dickson, 2013. "On Cobb-Douglas Preferences in Bilateral Oligopoly," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 79(4), pages 89-110.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:reldbu:rel_794_0089
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    Cited by:

    1. Gagnie Pascal Yebarth, 2025. "On Taxation Policy in Strategic Bilateral Exchange: A review," EconomiX Working Papers 2025-34, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    2. Alex Dickson & Simone Tonin, 2021. "An introduction to perfect and imperfect competition via bilateral oligopoly," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 133(2), pages 103-128, July.
    3. Mitra, Manipushpak & Ray, Indrajit & Roy, Souvik, 2024. "A Characterisation of Trading Equilibria in Strategic Market Games," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 83, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    4. Alex Dickson, 2017. "Multiple-aggregate games," Working Papers 1701, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics.

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    JEL classification:

    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General

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