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Job-Search Effort, Retirement Decision and Pension Reform: A Wage Bargaining Investigation

  • Fouad Khaskhoussi

    ()

    (GAINS-TEPP, University of Le Mans)

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    This paper studies the impact of wage bargaining on endogenous labor market participation of older workers and revisits the effects of pension reforms. Our main contribution to the literature on retirement is to show that in the context of wage flexibility, when wages are bargained, the financial gain associated with the incentive schemes to delay retirement is shared between workers and firms. In contrast, previous works on actuarially fair pension policy conventionally assume that these incentives are exclusively received by workers. Then, our model emphasizes the positive effects of incentives to delay retirement when the bargaining power of workers is positive. These incentive schemes do not only encourage employed individuals to delay their retirement, but also make searching more attractive to non-employed workers.

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2009/Volume29/EB-09-V29-I2-P71.pdf
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    Article provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.

    Volume (Year): 29 (2009)
    Issue (Month): 2 ()
    Pages: 1255-1263

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    Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00236
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    1. Langot, François & Moreno-Galbis, Eva, 2008. "Does the Growth Process Discriminate against Older Workers?," IZA Discussion Papers 3841, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    2. McCall, John J, 1970. "Economics of Information and Job Search," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(1), pages 113-26, February.
    3. Jean-Olivier Hairault & Francois Langot & Thepthida Sopraseuth, 2010. "Distance to Retirement and Older Workers' Employment: The Case for Delaying the Retirement Age," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(5), pages 1034-1076, 09.
    4. Cremer, Helmuth & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie & Pestieau, Pierre, 2004. "Social security, retirement age and optimal income taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(11), pages 2259-2281, September.
    5. Moen, E.R., 1995. "Competitive Search Equilibrium," Memorandum 37/1995, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    6. Bhattacharya, Joydeep & Reed, Robert, 2003. "Aging, Unemployment, and Welfare in a Life-Cycle Model with Costly Labor Market Search," Staff General Research Papers 10255, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    7. Gruber, Jonathan & Wise, David, 1998. "Social Security and Retirement: An International Comparison," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 158-63, May.
    8. Khaskhoussi Fouad & Langot Francois & Khaskhoussi Tarek & Cheron Arnaud, 2009. "Incentive Schemes to Delay Retirement and the Equilibrium Interplay with Human Capital Investment," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(1), pages 221-229.
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