Job Search with Bidder Memories
This paper revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers, in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding, have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this difference when hiring a worker. When a worker first meets a firm, the firm offers the worker a sufficient share of the match rents to avoid a bidding war in the future. The pair share the gains to trade. In this case, the Diamond paradox no longer holds.
|Date of creation:||01 Jul 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/pier
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Guido Menzio & Shouyong Shi, 2009.
"Efficient Search on the Job and the Business Cycle,"
NBER Working Papers
14905, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Guido Menzio & Shouyong Shi, 2011. "Efficient Search on the Job and the Business Cycle," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(3), pages 468 - 510.
- Guido Menzio & Shouyong Shi, 2011. "Efficient Search on the Job and the Business Cycle," Working Papers tecipa-437, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Guido Menzio & Shouyong Shi, 2008. "Efficient Search on the Job and the Business Cycle," Working Papers tecipa-327, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Guido Menzio & Shouyong Shi, 2008. "Efficient Search on the Job and the Business Cycle," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-029, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Burdett, Kenneth & Mortensen, Dale T, 1998. "Wage Differentials, Employer Size, and Unemployment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(2), pages 257-73, May.
- Albrecht, James & Axell, Bo, 1983.
"An Equilibrium Model of Search Unemployment,"
83-10, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Gaumont, Damien & Schindler, Martin & Wright, Randall, 2006.
"Alternative theories of wage dispersion,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 831-848, May.
- Damien Gaumont & Martin Schindler & Randall Wright, 2005. "Alternative Theories of Wage Dispersion," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-017, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Gaumont D. & Schindler M. & Wright R., 2005. "“Alternative Theories of Wage Dispersion”," Working Papers ERMES 0505, ERMES, University Paris 2.
- Burdett, Kenneth & Judd, Kenneth L, 1983. "Equilibrium Price Dispersion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 955-69, July.
- Moen, E.R., 1995.
"Competitive Search Equilibrium,"
37/1995, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Kenneth Burdett & Shouyong Shi & Randall Wright, 2001. "Pricing and Matching with Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(5), pages 1060-1085, October.
- Diamond, Peter A., 1971. "A model of price adjustment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 156-168, June.
- McCall, John J, 1970. "Economics of Information and Job Search," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(1), pages 113-26, February.
- Butters, Gerard R, 1977. "Equilibrium Distributions of Sales and Advertising Prices," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 465-91, October.
- Taylor, Curtis R, 1995. "The Long Side of the Market and the Short End of the Stick: Bargaining Power and Price Formation in Buyers', Sellers', and Balanced Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 837-55, August.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pen:papers:09-027. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dolly Guarini)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.