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Information Aggregation Under Strategic Delay


  • Hikmet Gunay

    () (University of Manitoba)


In this paper, we show that consumers delay their buying to learn the unknown quality of a product. Agents receive imperfect but informative signals about the unknown quality. Then, each one simultaneously decides whether or not to buy the product in one of the two periods. Consumers with moderate tastes will strategically delay their buying to the second period even though they receive a good signal. They deduce the true quality by observing the mass of first period buyers. We avoid equilibrium non-existence problem by using agents with different private values.

Suggested Citation

  • Hikmet Gunay, 2008. "Information Aggregation Under Strategic Delay," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(23), pages 1-8.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08l00007

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Caplin, Andrew & Leahy, John, 1994. "Business as Usual, Market Crashes, and Wisdom after the Fact," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 548-565, June.
    2. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, July.
    3. Nancy L. Stokey, 1979. "Intertemporal Price Discrimination," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 93(3), pages 355-371.
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    Cited by:

    1. Aoyagi, Masaki & Bhalla, Manaswini & Gunay, Hikmet, 2016. "Social learning and delay in a dynamic model of price competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 565-600.
    2. Hikmet Gunay, 2014. "Waiting for Signaling Quality," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 364-386, October.

    More about this item


    Intertemporal price discrimination;

    JEL classification:

    • L0 - Industrial Organization - - General


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