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Korrupte Staatsangestellte oder korrupte Regierungen: wer schadet mehr?

  • Johann Graf Lambsdorff
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    An increase in corruption by one point on a scale from 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt) lowers productivity by 4% of GDP and decreases net annual capital inflows by 0.5% of GDP. Central to the impact of corruption on productivity is its adverse influence on bureaucratic quality, that is, corrupt agents. Crucial for corruption to deter net annual capital inflows is its association with a lacking tradition of law and order, that is, corrupt principals. Anti-corruption reform should focus on public sector reform if priority is given to increasing productivity. Legal reform should be addressed if countries want to attract foreign capital. Ein Anstieg der Korruption um einen Punkt (auf einer Skala von 0 bis 10) verringert die Produktivität um 4% und die Nettokapitalzuflüsse um 0,5 % des Bruttoinlandsprodukts. Entscheidend für den negativen Einfluss auf die Produktivität ist der Zusammenhang zwischen Korruption und mangelnder Qualität der Bürokratie, also das Problem korrupter Staatsangestellter. Entscheidend für den Einfluss auf Nettokapitalimporte ist der Zusammenhang zwischen Korruption und fehlender rechtsstaatlicher Tradition, also das Problem mit korrupten Regierungen. Reformansätze sollten sich auf administrative Reformen konzentrieren, sofern eine Steigerung der Produktivität angestrebt wird. Um verstärkt Kapital aus dem Ausland anzulocken, sollte eine rechtsstaatliche Tradition aufgebaut werden.

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    Article provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its journal Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung.

    Volume (Year): 73 (2004)
    Issue (Month): 2 ()
    Pages: 200-211

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    Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:73-20-3
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    1. Daniel Kaufmann & Shang-Jin Wei, 1999. "Does "Grease Money" Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce?," NBER Working Papers 7093, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson Jr., 1996. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 72-96, March.
    3. Johann Graf Lambsdorff, 2003. "How Corruption Affects Productivity," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(4), pages 457-474, November.
    4. Wintrobe,Ronald, 1998. "The Political Economy of Dictatorship," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521583299, October.
    5. Howitt, Peter & Wintrobe, Ronald, 1995. "The political economy of inaction," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 329-353, March.
    6. Isham, Jonathan & Kaufmann,Daniel, 1995. "The forgotten rationale for policy reform : the productivity of investment projects," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1549, The World Bank.
    7. Toke S. Aidt, 2003. "Economic analysis of corruption: a survey," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(491), pages F632-F652, November.
    8. Johann Lambsdorff, 2003. "How corruption affects persistent capital flows," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 229-243, November.
    9. Lambsdorff, Johann Graf, 2002. " Corruption and Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(1-2), pages 97-125, October.
    10. repec:tpr:qjecon:v:110:y:1995:i:3:p:681-712 is not listed on IDEAS
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