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Politiques de rémunération des dirigeants et investissements liés à l'innovation dans les industries de haute technologie

Author

Listed:
  • Guillaume Garnotel

    (Université d'Aix-Marseille 3)

  • Patrick Loux

    (Université d'Aix-Marseille 3)

Abstract

(VF)Cet article vise à étudier le lien entre la structure de rémunération des dirigeants des entreprises de haute technologie et leur capacité à encourager les activités d'innovation. Il souligne les limites des contrats de rémunération habituels (bonus comptable, actions et stock-options) quant à la promotion de l'innovation, et propose de lier la rémunération du dirigeant de façon explicite à des mesures opérationnelles des activités d'innovation.(VA)The purpose of this study is to investigate into the link between the structure of CEO compensation in high technology firms and innovation activities. It stresses the weakness of traditional compensation contracts based on accounting and financial indicators in relation to innovation activities, and proposes to tie CEO compensation more explicitly to operational measures of innovation activities.

Suggested Citation

  • Guillaume Garnotel & Patrick Loux, 2008. "Politiques de rémunération des dirigeants et investissements liés à l'innovation dans les industries de haute technologie," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 11(4), pages 65-85, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:11:y:2008:i:q4:p:65-85
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    rémunération; dirigeants; innovation; haute technologie; compensation; CEO; high technology.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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