Politiques de rémunération des dirigeants et investissements liés à l'innovation dans les industries de haute technologie
(VF)Cet article vise à étudier le lien entre la structure de rémunération des dirigeants des entreprises de haute technologie et leur capacité à encourager les activités d'innovation. Il souligne les limites des contrats de rémunération habituels (bonus comptable, actions et stock-options) quant à la promotion de l'innovation, et propose de lier la rémunération du dirigeant de façon explicite à des mesures opérationnelles des activités d'innovation.(VA)The purpose of this study is to investigate into the link between the structure of CEO compensation in high technology firms and innovation activities. It stresses the weakness of traditional compensation contracts based on accounting and financial indicators in relation to innovation activities, and proposes to tie CEO compensation more explicitly to operational measures of innovation activities.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Josh Lerner & Julie Wulf, 2007.
"Innovation and Incentives: Evidence from Corporate R&D,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics,
MIT Press, vol. 89(4), pages 634-644, November.
- Josh Lerner & Julie Wulf, 2006. "Innovation and Incentives: Evidence from Corporate R&D," NBER Working Papers 11944, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- Bushman, Robert M. & Indjejikian, Raffi J. & Smith, Abbie, 1996. "CEO compensation: The role of individual performance evaluation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 161-193, April.
- Holthausen, Robert W. & Larcker, David F. & Sloan, Richard G., 1995. "Business unit innovation and the structure of executive compensation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2-3), pages 279-313, April. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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