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Capital-investissement en syndication:les enjeux en termes de gouvernance disciplinaire et cognitive à partir d’une étude de cas multi-sites

Listed author(s):
  • Anne Stévenot-Guéry


    (Université de Nancy 2)

Registered author(s):

    (VF)Les recherches sur le capital-investissement (CI) en syndication s’intéressent principalement aux mo-tifs et aux spécificités de la syndication du point de vue des investisseurs mais peu aux enjeux en termes de gouvernance et au point de vue des dirigeants. Aussi, cet article étudie les implications à la fois disciplinaires et cognitives de la syndication à partir d’une étude de onze cas d’entreprises financées par CI. Si les avantages en termes d’échanges et de création de ressources cognitives sont reconnus par certains acteurs, le principal inté-rêt de la syndication pour les dirigeants est de rendre plus difficile le contrôle par les CI et de leur ménager des opportunités d’enracinement en cas de conflit. Une approche socio-cognitive et comportementale de la gouvernance permet de mieux comprendre les implications de la syndication.(VA)Mainstream studies on the syndication of venture capital investments deal mostly with the motivation and the specificities of such syndication from an investors’ point of view. Few of them are interested in its implications for governance from the managers’ point of view. This paper explores both disciplinary and cognitive consequences of syndication on the basis of a qualitative study of eleven cases of firms financed by VCs. Although some investors and managers recognize the cognitive ad-vantages of syndication, the main interest for managers is that syndication makes investors’ control more diffi-cult and thus facilitates managers’ “entrenchment” strategies. The socio-cognitive analysis and the behavioural governance approach are very useful to a better understanding of the implications of VC syndication.

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    Article provided by in its journal Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie.

    Volume (Year): 10 (2007)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 141-178

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    Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:10:y:2007:i:q4:p:141-178
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    1. Peter Wirtz, 2006. "Compétences, conflits et création de valeur:vers une approche intégrée de la gouvernance," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie,, vol. 9(2), pages 187-201, June.
    2. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1989. "Management entrenchment : The case of manager-specific investments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 123-139, November.
    3. Admati, Anat R & Pfleiderer, Paul, 1994. " Robust Financial Contracting and the Role of Venture Capitalists," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(2), pages 371-402, June.
    4. Gérard Charreaux, 2002. "Variation sur le thème:"À la recherche de nouvelles fondations pour la finance et la gouvernance d'entreprise"," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie,, vol. 5(3), pages 5-68, September.
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