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Foreign (in)direct investment and corporate taxation

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  • Georg Wamser

Abstract

Foreign investments of multinational firms are often complex in that they involve conduit entities. In particular, a multinational can pursue either a direct or an indirect investment strategy, where the latter involves an intermediate corporate entity and is associated with enhanced opportunities for international tax planning. As a consequence, in the case of indirect investments, the role of corporate taxation in destination countries may change. This paper investigates the effects of corporate taxation on foreign investment decisions of German multinationals, taking explicitly into account that firms choose in a first stage the investment regime (direct vs. indirect). The empirical findings, consistent with theoretical predictions, suggest that tax effects differ according to whether the investment is direct or indirect.

Suggested Citation

  • Georg Wamser, 2011. "Foreign (in)direct investment and corporate taxation," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 44(4), pages 1497-1524, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:44:y:2011:i:4:p:1497-1524
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2011.01682.x
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Thiess Buettner & Michael Overesch & Georg Wamser, 2018. "Anti profit-shifting rules and foreign direct investment," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(3), pages 553-580, June.
    2. Daniel Dreßler & Michael Overesch, 2013. "Investment impact of tax loss treatment—empirical insights from a panel of multinationals," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(3), pages 513-543, June.
    3. Bao, Xiaohua & Deng, Jianpeng & Sun, Haoyu & Sun, Jin, 2022. "Trade policy uncertainty and foreign direct investment: Evidence from China’s WTO accession," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
    4. Gumpert, Anna & Hines, James R. & Schnitzer, Monika, 2011. "The use of tax havens in exemption regimes," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2011,30, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    5. Dmitry Erokhin, 2023. "Tax effects on foreign direct investment—Just a rerouting," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(9), pages 2808-2834, September.
    6. Overesch Michael, 2016. "Steuervermeidung multinationaler Unternehmen: Die Befunde der empirischen Forschung," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 17(2), pages 129-143, July.
    7. Egger, Peter H. & Merlo, Valeria & Wamser, Georg, 2014. "Unobserved tax avoidance and the tax elasticity of FDI," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 1-18.
    8. Jost H. Heckemeyer & Michael Overesch, 2017. "Multinationals’ profit response to tax differentials: Effect size and shifting channels," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(4), pages 965-994, November.
    9. Badi H. Baltagi & Peter Egger & Michael Pfaffermayr, 2014. "Panel Data Gravity Models of International Trade," CESifo Working Paper Series 4616, CESifo.
    10. Deborah Schanz & Andreas Dinkel & Sara Keller, 2017. "Tax attractiveness and the location of German-controlled subsidiaries," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 251-297, January.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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