A Competitive Duopoly where Information Spillovers can be Mutually Advantageous
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Thierry LAFAY, 2011. "A Competitive Duopoly where Information Spillovers can be Mutually Advantageous," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2011014, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Thierry Lafay, 2011. "A Competitive Duopoly where Information Spillovers can be mutually Advantageous," Post-Print hal-00826289, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
- Christophe Caron & Thierry Lafay, 2008. "How Risk Disciplines Pre-Commitment," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(3), pages 205-226, November.
- Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Slutsky, Steven M., 1990.
"Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 29-46, March.
- Hamilton, J.H. & Slutsky, S.M., 1988. "Endogenous Timing In Duopoly Games: Stackelberg Or Cournot Equilibria," Papers 88-4, Florida - College of Business Administration.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Use of Game Theory in Industrial Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 176-183, May.
- Marcel Boyer & Michel Moreaux, 1989.
"Uncertainty, Capacity and Flexibility: the Monopoly Case,"
Annals of Economics and Statistics,
GENES, issue 15-16, pages 291-313.
- Boyer, M. & Moreaux, A., 1989. "Uncertainty, Capacity And Flexibility: The Monopoly Case," Cahiers de recherche 8911, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Boyer, M. & Moreaux, A., 1989. "Uncertainty, Capacity and Flexibility: the Monopoly Case," Cahiers de recherche 8911, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Giovanni Maggi, 1996. "Endogenous Leadership in a New Market," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(4), pages 641-659, Winter.
- Pacheco-de-Almeida, Goncalo & Zemsky, Peter, 2003. " The Effect of Time-to-Build on Strategic Investment under Uncertainty," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 166-182, Spring.
- Spencer, Barbara J. & Brander, James A., 1992. "Pre-commitment and flexibility : Applications to oligopoly theory," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 1601-1626, December.
- Midori Hirokawa & Dan Sasaki, 2001. "Endogenously Asynchronous Entries into an Uncertain Industry," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(3), pages 435-461, September.
More about this item
KeywordsCournot; Stackelberg; preemption; information spillovers;
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cai:reldbu:rel_771_0079. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire). General contact details of provider: http://www.cairn.info/revue-recherches-economiques-de-louvain.htm .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.