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The Effect of Time-to-Build on Strategic Investment under Uncertainty

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  • Pacheco-de-Almeida, Goncalo
  • Zemsky, Peter

Abstract

We show that time-to-build, which creates a lag between the decision to invest and production, is an important element of industry structure. We study a multiperiod investment game where there is demand uncertainty. Adding time-to-build to the model alters the classic tradeoff between making strategic commitments and exploiting the option to wait. Furthermore, time-to-build gives rise to novel equilibria in which firms invest incrementally, which contrasts with most prior work on multiperiod investment games in which firms invest only once. We show how time-to-build affects firm heterogeneity, investment timing, the option value of waiting, the evolution of prices, and social welfare. Copyright 2003 by the RAND Corporation.

Suggested Citation

  • Pacheco-de-Almeida, Goncalo & Zemsky, Peter, 2003. " The Effect of Time-to-Build on Strategic Investment under Uncertainty," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 166-182, Spring.
  • Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:34:y:2003:i:1:p:166-82
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Marshall Robert C. & Meurer Michael J. & Richard Jean-Francois & Stromquist Walter, 1994. "Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 193-220, September.
    2. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1990. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 107-126.
    3. Burguet Roberto & Perry Martin K, 2007. "Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, pages 1-27.
    4. Encaoua, David & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1980. "Degree of Monopoly, Indices of Concentration and Threat of Entry," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 87-105, February.
    5. Mailath, George J. & Zemsky, Peter, 1991. "Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 467-486, November.
    6. Sen, Amartya, 1997. "On Economic Inequality," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198292975.
    7. Lance Brannman & Luke M. Froeb, 2000. "Mergers, Cartels, Set-Asides, and Bidding Preferences in Asymmetric Oral Auctions," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(2), pages 283-290, May.
    8. Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, 1990. "Asset Ownership and Market Structure in Oligopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 275-292.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lukach, R. & Kort, P.M. & Plasmans, J.E.J., 2007. "Strategic R&D with Knowledge Spillovers and Endogenous Time to Complete," Discussion Paper 2007-38, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Sameh Hachicha & Leila Kaaniche & Fathi Abid, 2011. "Sequential investment and delay: an agribusiness firm case study," Agricultural Finance Review, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 71(2), pages 240-258, August.
    3. Manish Popli & Ashutosh Sinha, 2014. "Determinants of early movers in cross-border merger and acquisition wave in an emerging market: A study of Indian firms," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 1075-1099, December.
    4. repec:eee:dyncon:v:82:y:2017:i:c:p:142-164 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Robert Salomon & Xavier Martin, 2008. "Learning, Knowledge Transfer, and Technology Implementation Performance: A Study of Time-to-Build in the Global Semiconductor Industry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(7), pages 1266-1280, July.
    6. Pierre Lasserre & Moez Souissi, 2007. "It Takes Two to Tango. La fusion : exercice de deux options réelles," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 178(2), pages 51-65.
    7. Thierry Lafay, 2011. "A Competitive Duopoly where Information Spillovers can be Mutually Advantageous," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 77(1), pages 79-100.
    8. Aïd, René & Federico, Salvatore & Pham, Huyên & Villeneuve, Bertrand, 2015. "Explicit investment rules with time-to-build and uncertainty," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 240-256.
    9. Fei Shi, 2008. "Endogenous Timing with Demand Uncertainty," TWI Research Paper Series 30, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universit�t Konstanz.
    10. repec:eee:eneeco:v:67:y:2017:i:c:p:300-314 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Genc, Talat S., 2017. "The impact of lead time on capital investments," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, pages 142-164.

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