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Fiscalité et offre de travail : une étude expérimentale

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  • Louis Lévy-Garboua
  • David Masclet
  • Claude Montmarquette

Abstract

The authors use experimental economics to examine how people adjust their labor supply in response to changes in tax rates. In this experiment, one participant randomly chosen is required to adjust his or her labor supply and is taxed to the benefit of another participant.We ran four different treatments defined by volume ofwork (high or low) andwhether the tax rate is chosen by the other participants or at random by the computer.We observe that the labor supply decreases (or: increases) with a rise (or: decline) in tax rates.We find a strong disincentive effect of taxation, particularly when thework volume is high and tax rates are set by tax recipients.

Suggested Citation

  • Louis Lévy-Garboua & David Masclet & Claude Montmarquette, 2006. "Fiscalité et offre de travail : une étude expérimentale," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 0(4), pages 135-145.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:ecoldc:ecop_175_0135
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Charness, Gary, 2000. "Responsibility and effort in an experimental labor market," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 375-384, July.
    5. Sillamaa, M. A., 1999. "Taxpayer behavior in response to taxation: comment and new experimental evidence," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 165-177.
    6. Sutter, Matthias & Weck-Hannemann, Hannelore, 2003. "Taxation and the Veil of Ignorance--A Real Effort Experiment on the Laffer Curve," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 115(1-2), pages 217-240, April.
    7. Joel Slemrod, 1996. "High-Income Families and the Tax Changes of the 1980s: The Anatomy of Behavioral Response," NBER Chapters, in: Empirical Foundations of Household Taxation, pages 169-192, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Swenson, Charles W., 1988. "Taxpayer behavior in response to taxation: An experimental analysis," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 1-28.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stefania Ottone & Ferruccio Ponzano, 2011. "How people perceive the Welfare State: a real-effort experiment," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 58(2), pages 165-183, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    taxation; elasticities; labor supply; experimental economics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply

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