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Approche expérimentale de l'incidence de la fiscalité sur l'offre de travail : Une étude comparative des systèmes d'imposition

Listed author(s):
  • David Masclet
  • Claude Montmarquette

This experiment evaluates various systems of taxation on the number of real tasks performed by participants and in terms of fiscal income generated to help government in its redistributive goal. The first treatment concerns a proportional system of taxation. The second treatment considers an equivalent progressive income tax system. Finally, participants are submitted sequentially to different flat tax rates. This last treatment evaluates the reaction of participants to fiscal changes. Our results support clearly that a progressive taxation system reduces work effort relative to a single flat tax. The single flat tax system yields more fiscal income. The results also show that individuals are affected by their own tax system and by the other forms of taxation they experienced before L'enjeu de cet article est de savoir si l'incidence fiscale sur l'offre de travail et sur les rentrées fiscales est identique selon le système d'imposition en vigueur. Ainsi, un système progressif décourage-t-il davantage l'offre de travail qu'un système proportionnel ? Quel système de taxation permet à l'état de remplir au mieux son rôle redistributif ? Afin de répondre à ces questions, l'approche mobilisée est l'économie expérimentale. Trois traitements ont été réalisés. Dans un premier traitement, les participants doivent réaliser un effort réel sous un système d'imposition proportionnel. Dans un second traitement, le système d'imposition en vigueur est un système progressif équivalent. Enfin dans un troisième traitement, les participants sont confrontés successivement à plusieurs systèmes d'imposition. Ce dernier traitement permet d'étudier l'incidence de changement de système sur les décisions individuelles. Nos résultats expérimentaux montrent que les effets désincitatifs sur l'offre de travail sont plus importants sous un système progressif que sous un système proportionnel sans contexte. De plus le systèms proportionnel sans contexte permet des rentrées fiscales plus importantes. Enfin, un autre résultat intéressant de notre étude est que les individus ne sont pas uniquement influencés par leur propre système fiscal mais également par leurs expériences fiscales précédentes.

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Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 2007s-15.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 01 Jul 2007
Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2007s-15
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  1. Sutter, Matthias & Weck-Hannemann, Hannelore, 2003. "Taxation and the Veil of Ignorance--A Real Effort Experiment on the Laffer Curve," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 115(1-2), pages 217-240, April.
  2. Guy Lacroix & Nadia Joubert & Bernard Fortin, 2004. "Offre de travail au noir en présence de la fiscalité et des contrôles fiscaux," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 164(3), pages 145-163.
  3. Saez, Emmanuel, 2003. "The effect of marginal tax rates on income: a panel study of 'bracket creep'," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 1231-1258, May.
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  7. Bernard Fortin & Gaétan Garneau & Guy Lacroix & Thomas Lemieux & Claude Montmarquette, 1996. "L'économie souterraine au Québec : Mythes et réalités," CIRANO Monographs, CIRANO, number 1996mo-01.
  8. Louis Lévy-Garboua & David Masclet & Claude Montmarquette, 2005. "A micro-foundation for the Laffer curve in a real effort experiment," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00196410, HAL.
  9. Sillamaa, M. A., 1999. "How work effort responds to wage taxation: An experimental test of a zero top marginal tax rate," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 125-134, July.
  10. Sillamaa, M. A., 1999. "How work effort responds to wage taxation: A non-linear versus a linear tax experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 219-233, June.
  11. Joel Slemrod, 2001. "A General Model of the Behavioral Response to Taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 8(2), pages 119-128, March.
  12. Efraim Sadka, 1976. "On Income Distribution, Incentive Effects and Optimal Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 43(2), pages 261-267.
  13. Sillamaa, M. A., 1999. "Taxpayer behavior in response to taxation: comment and new experimental evidence," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 165-177.
  14. Edmund S. Phelps, 1973. "Taxation of Wage Income for Economic Justice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 331-354.
  15. Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard, 1986. "Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 728-741, September.
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