IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/rlecon/v5y2009i1n27.html

Building Encroachments

Author

Listed:
  • Rizzolli Matteo

    (University of Milan - Bicocca)

Abstract

Property law usually addresses encroachments with ejectment. Building encroachments differ, however, as restoring a landowner's property claims implies the reversal of often large costs sustained by the builder. The authority thus confronts the following dilemma: either it stands by the landowner, thereby facing the social costs of undoing significant investments and possibly supporting an opportunistic landowner that tries to hold up the builder, or it defends the investment of the builder thereby endorsing a kind of private eminent domain. In addressing building encroachments, national property laws have deployed different remedies ranging from a property rule in favor of the landowner to a property rule in favor of the builder with a variety of liability rules, often hybridized with property rules, in between. This paper models the builder-owner conflict after the theory of optional law (Ayres, 2005); it frames different national solutions into a common analytical setting; and it evaluates the different laws in their relative allocative and distributive outcomes and their capacity to constrain opportunistic behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Rizzolli Matteo, 2009. "Building Encroachments," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 661-700, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:5:y:2009:i:1:n:27
    DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1266
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/1555-5879.1266
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.2202/1555-5879.1266?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or

    for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Williamson, Oliver E, 1973. "Markets and Hierarchies: Some Elementary Considerations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 316-325, May.
    2. Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2003. "A Proposal for a New Rule of Adverse Possession," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 289-301, November.
    3. Hylton Keith N, 2005. "The Theory of Penalties and the Economics of Criminal Law," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(2), pages 175-201, September.
    4. Netter, Jeffry M. & Hersch, Philip L. & Manson, Willam D., 1986. "An economic analysis of adverse possession statutes," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 217-228, December.
    5. Stephanie Jacques, 1992. "The Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 74(5), pages 1316-1323.
    6. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Miceli, Thomas J. & Sirmans, C. F., 1995. "An economic theory of adverse possession," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 161-173, June.
    8. Jacques, Stephanie, . "The Coase Theorem and the Endowment Effect," SS-AAEA Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 9.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Thomas J. Miceli, 2018. "On proportionality of punishments and the economic theory of crime," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 303-314, December.
    2. Philip A. Curry & Matthew Doyle, 2016. "Integrating Market Alternatives Into The Economic Theory Of Optimal Deterrence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(4), pages 1873-1883, October.
    3. Mark D. White, 2018. "The neglected nuance of Beccaria’s theory of punishment," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 315-329, December.
    4. Muñoz-Herrera, Manuel & Palacio, Luis Alejandro, 2014. "Drug Dealing In Bucaramanga: Case Study In A Drug Producing Country," MPRA Paper 58523, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Cain Michael, 2016. "An Economic Assessment of Criminal Behaviour," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 77-94, March.
    6. Alfred Endres & Bianca Rundshagen, 2012. "Escalating penalties: a supergame approach," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 29-49, March.
    7. Matthew Baker & Thomas Miceli & C. F. Sirmans & Geoffrey K. Turnbull, 2001. "Property Rights by Squatting: Land Ownership Risk and Adverse Possession Statutes," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 77(3), pages 360-370.
    8. Thomas J. Miceli, 2022. "Counting offenders’ gains? Economic and moral considerations in the determination of criminality," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 475-496, December.
    9. Buehler, Stefan & Eschenbaum, Nicolas, 2020. "Explaining escalating prices and fines: A unified approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 153-164.
    10. Hall, Jeremy & Martin, Ben R., 2019. "Towards a taxonomy of research misconduct: The case of business school research," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 414-427.
    11. Colin C Williams, 2021. "Tackling Undeclared Self-Employment in South-East Europe: from Deterrents to Preventative Policy Measures," Economic Alternatives, University of National and World Economy, Sofia, Bulgaria, issue 2, pages 280-298, July.
    12. Simplice A. Asongu, 2013. "Fighting Corruption when Existing Corruption-Control Levels Count: What do Wealth-Effects Tell us in Africa?," Institutions and Economies (formerly known as International Journal of Institutions and Economies), Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya, vol. 5(3), pages 53-74, October.
    13. Doyle, Chris & Smith, Jennifer C, 1997. "Crime and Drugs : An Economic Approach," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 477, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    14. Khalil, Umair, 2017. "Do more guns lead to more crime? Understanding the role of illegal firearms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 342-361.
    15. van Ours, Jan C. & Williams, Jenny & Ward, Shannon, 2015. "Bad Behavior: Delinquency, Arrest and Early School Leaving," CEPR Discussion Papers 10755, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Rodrigo Nobre Fernandez & Felipe Garcia Ribeiro & Jean Del Ponte Duarte, 2018. "Effects of Software Piracy on Economic Growth," International Journal of Economics and Finance, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 10(6), pages 1-11, June.
    17. Rajeev K. Goel & Ummad Mazhar & James W. Saunoris, 2020. "Business operations, contestability, bureaucratic holdup, and bribe solicitations," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 1484-1510, November.
    18. Christoph Engel, 2016. "Experimental Criminal Law. A Survey of Contributions from Law, Economics and Criminology," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics 2016_07, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics.
    19. Ibanez, Marcela & Carlsson, Fredrik, 2010. "A survey-based choice experiment on coca cultivation," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 249-263, November.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:5:y:2009:i:1:n:27. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyterbrill.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.