Property law usually addresses encroachments with ejectment. Building encroachments differ, however, as restoring a landowners property claims implies the reversal of often large costs sustained by the builder. The authority thus confronts the following dilemma: either it stands by the landowner, thereby facing the social costs of undoing significant investments and possibly supporting an opportunistic landowner that tries to hold up the builder, or it defends the investment of the builder thereby endorsing a kind of private eminent domain. In addressing building encroachments, national property laws have deployed different remedies ranging from a property rule in favor of the landowner to a property rule in favor of the builder with a variety of liability rules, often hybridized with property rules, in between. This paper models the builder-owner conflict after the theory of optional law (Ayres, 2005); it frames different national solutions into a common analytical setting; and it evaluates the different laws in their relative allocative and distributive outcomes and their capacity to constrain opportunistic behavior.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 5 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (November)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://www.degruyter.com|
|Order Information:||Web: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/rle|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2003. "A Proposal for a New Rule of Adverse Possession," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 289-301, November.
- Williamson, Oliver E, 1973. "Markets and Hierarchies: Some Elementary Considerations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 316-325, May.
- Hylton Keith N, 2005. "The Theory of Penalties and the Economics of Criminal Law," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(2), pages 175-201, September.
- Gary S. Becker, 1968.
"Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169-169.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:5:y:2009:i:1:n:27. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.