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Protecting Private Property with Constitutional Judicial Review: A Social Welfare Approach

Author

Listed:
  • Grossman Peter Z.

    (Butler University; Indiana University School of Law - Indianapolis)

  • Cole Daniel H.

    (Butler University; Indiana University School of Law - Indianapolis)

Abstract

This article uses a social welfare approach to determine if and when the institution of constitutional judicial review of property regulation and expropriation is efficient. A model is proposed in which property rights protection is a component of social costs. Constitutional judicial review is assumed to either add to or subtract on net from those costs, affecting social welfare generally. It will be shown that under realistic conditions, reflected in real instances, that constitutional judicial review might not enhance economic efficiency or overall social welfare. We show that the efficiency of constitutional judicial review is likely to vary within the larger institutional context.

Suggested Citation

  • Grossman Peter Z. & Cole Daniel H., 2009. "Protecting Private Property with Constitutional Judicial Review: A Social Welfare Approach," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 233-250, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:5:y:2009:i:1:n:10
    DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1309
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Claude Ménard (ed.), 1997. "Transaction Cost Economics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1150, June.
    2. Clague, Christopher & Keefer, Philip & Knack, Stephen & Olson, Mancur, 1996. "Property and Contract Rights in Autocracies and Democracies," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 243-276, June.
    3. Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, 1995. "Institutions And Economic Performance: Cross‐Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(3), pages 207-227, November.
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