IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Regulatory Barriers to Litigation in India


  • Narang Prashant

    (LL.M. Candidate, Jindal Global LawSchool, Sonepat, Haryana, India)


The legal profession in India does not seem to have any significant entry barriers as are prevalent in other sectors in India. Yet litigation fails to attract talented law graduates, except those who have a parental/family background in litigation. Litigation in India is marked by the presence of small and middle-size family-run law firms who employ law graduates as juniors and may fall short of world class corporate culture. On the other hand, it is rare for a fresh law graduate to become an entrepreneur-style practitioner on their own, right after college. This is in contrast with other sectors where graduates with degrees can take a bank loan and can start an enterprise. This paper reviews the regulatory framework of how legal barriers with noble intentions makes the sustainability of new entrants almost impossible in the legal profession and thus discourage new entrants from choosing litigation as a career after college. These barriers, though not entry barriers in a strict sense, are operational barriers and include: a) restrictions on the legal form of a law firm; b) a ban on advertising; c) a ban on charging a contingent fee; d) a ban on moonlighting. The paper also looks at moral hazard associated with self-regulatory bodies viz. the Bar Council of India and the State Bar Councils. Finally, the paper makes a case for reforms in the form of doing away with restrictions to lay down a level-playing field for all practitioners and foster competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Narang Prashant, 2011. "Regulatory Barriers to Litigation in India," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(3), pages 1-16, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ajlecn:v:2:y:2011:i:3:n:4

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Winand Emons, 1997. "Credence Goods and Fraudelent Experts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 107-119, Spring.
    2. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu, 2007. "Contingent fees versus legal expenses insurance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 351-361, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:ajlecn:v:2:y:2011:i:3:n:4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.