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Tax Dispute Resolution and Taxpayer Screening

Author

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  • Sato Hideki

    (Fukuoka Women’s University, Department of International Liberal Arts, Fukuoka, Japan)

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to examine the characteristics of the tax tribunal, and the functions of its dispute resolution decisions according to a law and economics perspective. We show that the tax agency can use the tax tribunal as a screening device. That is, the tax agency can inform taxpayers of income tax that minimizes their expected costs, and then can screen taxpayers based on whether they appeal to the tax tribunal.

Suggested Citation

  • Sato Hideki, 2019. "Tax Dispute Resolution and Taxpayer Screening," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-4, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ajlecn:v:10:y:2019:i:1:p:4:n:2
    DOI: 10.1515/ajle-2018-0008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Frank A. Cowell, 1990. "Cheating the Government: The Economics of Evasion," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262532484, December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • K34 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Tax Law
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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