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Bank failure and bail-in: an introduction

Author

Listed:
  • Chennells, Lucy

    (Bank of England)

  • Wingfield, Venetia

    (Bank of England)

Abstract

During the financial crisis, several governments bailed out failing financial institutions because letting the firms fail and enter insolvency would have caused excessive disruption to the critical services that these institutions provide and to the wider financial system. Following the crisis, the framework for managing the failure of financial firms was reformed and a new tool, known as bail-in, was developed. Bail-in allows the authorities to make sure that shareholders and creditors of a firm bear the costs of failure, without recourse to public funds.

Suggested Citation

  • Chennells, Lucy & Wingfield, Venetia, 2015. "Bank failure and bail-in: an introduction," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England, vol. 55(3), pages 228-241.
    • Handle: RePEc:boe:qbullt:0179
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gara M. Afonso & João A. C. Santos & James Traina, 2014. "Do \\"Too-Big-to-Fail\\" banks take on more risk?," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Dec, pages 41-58.
    2. Brierley, Peter, 2009. "Financial Stability Paper No 5: The UK Special Resolution Regime for Failing Banks in an International Context," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 5, Bank of England.
    3. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2008. "Microeconomics of Banking, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262062704, December.
    4. Farag, Marc & Harland , Damian & Nixon, Dan, 2013. "Bank capital and liquidity," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England, vol. 53(3), pages 201-215.
    5. Viral Acharya & Itamar Drechsler & Philipp Schnabl, 2014. "A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(6), pages 2689-2739, December.
    6. Vazquez, Francisco & Federico, Pablo, 2015. "Bank funding structures and risk: Evidence from the global financial crisis," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 1-14.
    7. Davies, Geoffrey & Dobler, Marc, 2011. "Bank resolution and safeguarding the creditors left behind," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England, vol. 51(3), pages 213-223.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mark Billings & Simon Mollan & Philip Garnett, 2021. "Debating banking in Britain: The Colwyn committee, 1918," Business History, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 63(6), pages 944-965, August.
    2. Martin Brown & Ioanna S. Evangelou & Helmut Stix, 2017. "Banking Crises, Bail-ins and Money Holdings," Working Papers 2017-2, Central Bank of Cyprus.
    3. Thorsten Beck & Samuel Da-Rocha-Lopes & André F Silva & Francesca Cornelli, 2021. "Sharing the Pain? Credit Supply and Real Effects of Bank Bail-ins [High wage workers and high wage firms]," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 34(4), pages 1747-1788.
    4. Farmer, J Doyne & Kleinnijenhuis, Alissa M & Nahai-Williamson, Paul & Wetzer, Thom, 2020. "Foundations of system-wide financial stress testing with heterogeneous institutions," Bank of England working papers 861, Bank of England.
    5. Balluck, Kushal & Galiay, Artus & Ferrara, Gerardo & Hogarth, Glenn, 2016. "The small bank failures of the early 1990s: another story of boom and bust," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England, vol. 56(1), pages 41-51.
    6. Farmer, J. Doyne & Goodhart, C. A. E. & Kleinnijenhuis, Alissa M., 2021. "Systemic implications of the bail-in design," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 111903, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Lorenzo Gai & Federica Ielasi & Martina Mainini, 2021. "The Impact of Bail-in Risk on Bank Bondholders," International Journal of Business and Management, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 15(9), pages 105-105, July.
    8. Paola Leone & Pasqualina Porretta & Luca Riccetti, 2021. "European Significant Bank Stock Market Volatility: Is there a Bail-In Effect?," International Journal of Business and Management, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 14(5), pages 1-32, July.
    9. Lindstrom, Ryan & Osborne, Matthew, 2020. "Has bail-in increased market discipline? An empirical investigation of European banks’ credit spreads," Bank of England working papers 887, Bank of England.

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