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Does Legislative Institutionalization Impact Policy Adoption? New Evidence from the Colonial and Early State Legislatures 1757–1795

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  • Elizabeth I. Dorssom

Abstract

Objective. Using an original data set, I explore the impact of institutionalization on policy adoption using a case study of the use of sunset provisions across the 13 colonies and states from 1757 to 1795. This time frame allows for a thorough investigation of sunset provision use during the period in which the colonial legislatures were undergoing the institutionalization process, and had yet to develop standing committee systems. Methods. I employ a fractional logit regression to examine the effect of legislative institutionalization on the rate of sunset provision use. Results. As the colonial legislatures institutionalized, sunset provisions were less frequently used. Conclusion. Through exploring sunset provision use prior to partisanship and standing committee development, this study extends our understanding of the impact of institutionalization on policy adoption.

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  • Elizabeth I. Dorssom, 2021. "Does Legislative Institutionalization Impact Policy Adoption? New Evidence from the Colonial and Early State Legislatures 1757–1795," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 102(4), pages 1451-1465, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:socsci:v:102:y:2021:i:4:p:1451-1465
    DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.12956
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gilligan, Thomas W & Krehbiel, Keith, 1987. "Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 287-335, Fall.
    2. Brian Baugus & Feler Bose & Jeffry Jacob, 2021. "Get in line: Do part‐time legislatures use sunset laws to keep executive agencies in check," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(1), pages 185-199, January.
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