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The governance of risk management: The importance of directors’ independence and financial knowledge

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  • Georges Dionne
  • Olfa Maalaoui Chun
  • Thouraya Triki

Abstract

We test the effects of the independence and financial knowledge of directors on risk management and firm value in the gold mining industry. Our original hand‐collected database on directors’ financial education, accounting background, and financial experience allows us to measure the effect of financial knowledge on risk management activities. We show that directors’ financial knowledge increases firm value through the risk management channel. This effect is strengthened by the independence of the directors on the board and on the audit committee. Extending the dimension of education, we show that, following unexpected shocks to gold prices, firms with financially educated directors are more effective in hedging than average firms in the industry. Firms that hedge more also attracts highly educated directors on their board and audit committee. As a policy implication, our results suggest adding the experience and education dimensions to the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act and New York Stock Exchange requirements for better governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Georges Dionne & Olfa Maalaoui Chun & Thouraya Triki, 2019. "The governance of risk management: The importance of directors’ independence and financial knowledge," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 22(3), pages 247-277, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:rmgtin:v:22:y:2019:i:3:p:247-277
    DOI: 10.1111/rmir.12129
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    Cited by:

    1. Georges Dionne & Olfa Maalaoui Chun & Thouraya Triki, 2019. "The governance of risk management: The importance of directors’ independence and financial knowledge," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 22(3), pages 247-277, September.
    2. Dionne, Georges & El Hraiki, Rayane & Mnasri, Mohamed, 2023. "Determinants and real effects of joint hedging: An empirical analysis of US oil and gas producers," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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