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Elections, Opportunism, Partisanship and Sovereign Ratings in Developing Countries

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  • Paul M. Vaaler
  • Burkhard N. Schrage
  • Steven A. Block

Abstract

We empirically examine whether and how opportunistic and partisan political business cycle (“PBC”) considerations explain election‐period decisions by credit rating agencies (“agencies”) publishing developing country sovereign risk‐ratings (“ratings”). Analyses of 391 agency ratings for 19 countries holding 39 presidential elections from 1987–2000, initially suggest that elections themselves prompt rating downgrades consistent with opportunistic PBC considerations, that incumbents are all likely to implement election‐period policies detrimental to post‐election creditworthiness. But more refined analyses, integrating both opportunistic and partisan PBC considerations in a unified framework, suggest that election‐period agency downgrades (upgrades) are more likely as right‐wing (left‐wing) incumbents, become more vulnerable to ouster by challengers. Together, these results underscore the importance of integrating both opportunistic and partisan PBC considerations into any explanation of election‐period risk assessments of agencies and, perhaps, other private, foreign‐based financial actors important to the pricing and allocation of capital for lending and investment in the developing world.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul M. Vaaler & Burkhard N. Schrage & Steven A. Block, 2006. "Elections, Opportunism, Partisanship and Sovereign Ratings in Developing Countries," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 154-170, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:10:y:2006:i:1:p:154-170
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9361.2005.00307.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Guillermo Larraín & Helmut Reisen & Julia von Maltzan, 1997. "Emerging Market Risk and Sovereign Credit Ratings," OECD Development Centre Working Papers 124, OECD Publishing.
    2. World Bank, 2002. "World Development Indicators 2002," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 13921, December.
    3. Alberto Alesina & Nouriel Roubini & Gerald D. Cohen, 1997. "Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510944, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Carnahan & Sebastian Saiegh, 2021. "Electoral uncertainty and financial volatility: Evidence from two‐round presidential races in emerging markets," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(1), pages 109-132, March.
    2. Narjess Boubakri & Jean-Claude Cosset & Houcem Smaoui, 2011. "Political Institutions and Sovereign Credit Spreads," Working Papers 647, Economic Research Forum, revised 12 Jan 2011.
    3. Andreas Fuchs & Kai Gehring, 2017. "The Home Bias in Sovereign Ratings," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 15(6), pages 1386-1423.
    4. Dionísio Dias Carneiro & Thomas Wu, 2010. "Sovereign Risk and Out‐of‐Equilibrium Exchange Rate Dynamics," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(4), pages 699-711, November.
    5. Christopher Balding, 2011. "CDS Pricing and Elections in Emerging Markets," Journal of Emerging Market Finance, Institute for Financial Management and Research, vol. 10(2), pages 121-173, August.
    6. Cristina Bodea & Raymond Hicks, 2018. "Sovereign credit ratings and central banks: Why do analysts pay attention to institutions?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 340-365, November.
    7. Mahmoud Haddad & Sam Hakim, 2008. "The Impact of War and Terrorism on Sovereign Risk in MENA Countries," Working Papers 394, Economic Research Forum, revised 03 Jan 2008.
    8. Alexander Opitz, 2018. "“Comrades, Let's March!”.† The Revolution of 1905 and its impact on financial markets," European Review of Economic History, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(1), pages 28-52.
    9. Eichler, Stefan & Plaga, Timo, 2017. "The political determinants of government bond holdings," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 73(PA), pages 1-21.
    10. Luis Fernando Medina & Marcelo Bucheli & Minyoung Kim, 2019. "Good friends in high places: Politico-economic determinants of the expropriation and taxation of multinational firms," Journal of International Business Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 2(2), pages 119-141, June.
    11. Johannes W. Fedderke, 2013. "Promotion and Relegation between Country Risk Classes as Maintained by Country Risk Rating Agencies," Working Papers 376, Economic Research Southern Africa.
    12. Makram El‐Shagi & Gregor von Schweinitz, 2022. "Why they keep missing: An empirical investigation of sovereign bond ratings and their timing," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 69(2), pages 186-224, May.
    13. Paul Vaaler & Barclay James & Ruth Aguilera, 2008. "Risk and capital structure in Asian project finance," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 25-50, January.
    14. Nick Obradovich, 2017. "Climate change may speed democratic turnover," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 140(2), pages 135-147, January.
    15. Vaaler, Paul M., 2006. "Electoral Politics and Foreign Project Investment in Developing Countries," Working Papers 06-0125, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    16. Duygun, Meryem & Ozturk, Huseyin & Shaban, Mohamed, 2016. "The role of sovereign credit ratings in fiscal discipline," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 197-216.
    17. Qi, Yaxuan & Roth, Lukas & Wald, John K., 2010. "Political rights and the cost of debt," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(2), pages 202-226, February.

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