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What Does the Discursive Paradox Really Mean for Democracy?

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  • Valeria Ottonelli

Abstract

Pettit's claim that the discovery of the so‐called ‘discursive paradox’ bears important implications for the normative theory of deliberative democracy has been challenged on the ground that there are substantial structural differences between the fora of democratic deliberation and the judicial context in which the paradox first emerged. In this article I defend Pettit's claim against these objections, but I also reject the implications Pettit draws from his discussion of the paradox. Specifically, I argue against one of the key assumptions on which Pettit's discussion rests: that in order to function properly as a guarantee against tyranny deliberation requires consistency. The upshot of the discussion is that the discursive paradox is, indeed, relevant for the theory of deliberative democracy. However, contrary to what Pettit's argument suggests, the discursive paradox is not relevant because it reveals a conflict between deliberation and democracy. Rather, it is relevant because it reveals a conflict between deliberative democracy and the requirement of collective consistency.

Suggested Citation

  • Valeria Ottonelli, 2010. "What Does the Discursive Paradox Really Mean for Democracy?," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 58(4), pages 666-687, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:polstu:v:58:y:2010:i:4:p:666-687
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2010.00821.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Franz Dietrich, 2007. "A generalised model of judgment aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(4), pages 529-565, June.
    2. Dryzek, John S. & List, Christian, 2003. "Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(1), pages 1-28, January.
    3. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2008. "A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(1), pages 59-78, June.
    4. List, Christian & Pettit, Philip, 2002. "Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 89-110, April.
    5. Brennan, Geoffrey, 2001. "Collective coherence?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 197-211, June.
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