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Klimaschutz oder Interessenpolitik: Über einige ungewollte Resultate ökonomischer Politikberatung


  • Georg Erdmann


The European system of tradable CO_2 allowances is an important step towards implementing a market oriented environment policy. For the time being, the quantitative emission reductions defined in the National Allocation Plans (NAP) are still minor, but this outcome seems acceptable because institution building is of high priority during the first phase 2005-2007. Later, more ambitious emission reductions will follow. A closer look at the genesis of the NAP raises however some doubts about the future effectiveness of the new instrument. By analysing the CO_2 allocation decisions in Germany the article shows that the greenhouse gas issue can today successfully be misused by politicians and interest groups towards achieving egoistic goals and it concludes that this did happen at the expense of the proclaimed environmental target. Due to the particular character of the greenhouse gas problem this diagnosis may hold as long as no socially and economically acceptable greenhouse gas abatement technologies have become available. Copyright Verein für Socialpolitik und Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2005

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  • Georg Erdmann, 2005. "Klimaschutz oder Interessenpolitik: Über einige ungewollte Resultate ökonomischer Politikberatung," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 6(3), pages 347-367, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:perwir:v:6:y:2005:i:3:p:347-367

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Green, Richard J & Newbery, David M, 1992. "Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 929-953, October.
    2. Schneider, Friedrich & Volkert, Juergen, 1999. "No chance for incentive-oriented environmental policies in representative democracies? A Public Choice analysis," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 123-138, October.
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