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Indexation Rules, Risk Aversion and Imperfect Information

Author

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  • Corrado Benassi

    (Universitý di Bologna)

  • Antonello E. Scorcu

    (Universitý di Bologna)

Abstract

Nominal wage adjustment is modelled as resulting from bargaining between a risk-neutral firm and a risk-averse worker, in an environment where the rate of inflation is a random variable. Risk aversion makes for endogenous indexation arrangements, which deliver partial indexation as they exploit imperfect inflation indices; moreover, risk aversion generates a positive correlation between indexation and inflation variance. The model suggests a distinction between complete versus incomplete inflation adjustment, on the one hand, and perfect versus imperfect adjustment, on the other. Copyright 2003 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester.

Suggested Citation

  • Corrado Benassi & Antonello E. Scorcu, 2003. "Indexation Rules, Risk Aversion and Imperfect Information," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 71(3), pages 330-340, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:manchs:v:71:y:2003:i:3:p:330-340
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Brent R. Moulton, 1996. "Bias in the Consumer Price Index: What Is the Evidence?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 159-177, Fall.
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    6. Fischer, Stanley, 1977. "Wage indexation and macroeconomics stability," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 107-147, January.
    7. Ehrenberg, Ronald G & Danziger, Leif & San, Gee, 1983. "Cost-of-Living Adjustment Clauses in Union Contracts: A Summary of Results," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(3), pages 215-245, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jan Boone & Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund & Jan C. van Ours, 2007. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(518), pages 399-421, March.
    2. Forslund, Anders & Gottfries, Nils & Westermark, Andreas, 2005. "Real and nominal wage adjustment in open economies," Working Paper Series 2005:23, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    3. Stefan Eriksson & Jonas Lagerström, 2006. "Competition between Employed and Unemployed Job Applicants: Swedish Evidence," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(3), pages 373-396, October.
    4. Jacob Goeree & Thomas Palfrey & Brian Rogers, 2004. "Self-Correcting Information Cascades," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000153, UCLA Department of Economics.
    5. Elin Halvorsen & Thor O. Thoresen, 2011. "Parents' Desire to Make Equal Inter Vivos Transfers," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 57(1), pages 121-155, March.
    6. Altonji Joseph G & Villanueva Ernesto, 2007. "The Marginal Propensity to Spend on Adult Children," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-52, February.
    7. Karel Janda, 2006. "Lender and Borrower as Principal and Agent," Working Papers IES 2006/24, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2006.
    8. Jan Boone & Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund & Jan C. van Ours, 2007. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(518), pages 399-421, March.
    9. Mann, Stefan, 2003. "Die Expertenbewertung als Alternative zur Kontingenzbewertung," German Journal of Agricultural Economics, Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, Department for Agricultural Economics, vol. 52(08), pages 1-8.
    10. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:17:y:2006:i:5:p:1-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Jürgen Huber & Matthias Sutter & Michael Kirchler, 2004. "Is more information always better? Experimental financial markets with asymmetric information," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-13, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.

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