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Dual Poverty Trap: Intra‐ and Intergenerational Linkages in Frictional Labor Markets

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  • RYO HORII
  • MASARU SASAKI

Abstract

This paper constructs an overlapping generations model with a frictional labor market to explain persistent low education in developing countries. When parents are uneducated, their children often face difficulties in finishing school and therefore are likely to remain uneducated. Moreover, if children expect that other children of the same generation will not receive an education, they expect that firms will not create enough jobs for educated workers, and thus are further discouraged from schooling. These intergenerational and intragenerational mechanisms reinforce each other, creating a serious poverty trap. Escape from the trap requires the well-organized and combined implementation of a subsidy for schooling, the provision of free education, support for disadvantaged children, and public awareness programs.
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Suggested Citation

  • Ryo Horii & Masaru Sasaki, 2012. "Dual Poverty Trap: Intra‐ and Intergenerational Linkages in Frictional Labor Markets," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 14(1), pages 131-160, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:14:y:2012:i:1:p:131-160
    DOI: j.1467-9779.2011.01536.x
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2011.01536.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Mayuri Chaturvedi, 2022. "A Model of Rent Seeking and Inequality," Working Papers 202215, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.
    2. Owasim Akram & Mathilde Maitrot & Thomas Denk, 2020. "Generational Bargain, Transfer of Disadvantages and Extreme Poverty: A Qualitative Enquiry from Bangladesh," The European Journal of Development Research, Palgrave Macmillan;European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), vol. 32(4), pages 1173-1194, September.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • J62 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Job, Occupational and Intergenerational Mobility; Promotion
    • J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand

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