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An Analysis of Insiders' Use of Prepaid Variable Forward Transactions

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  • ALAN D. JAGOLINZER
  • STEVEN R. MATSUNAGA
  • P. ERIC YEUNG

Abstract

This study examines firm performance surrounding insiders' prepaid variable forward (PVF) transactions to infer insiders' information when they enter these off‐market contracts. PVFs allow insiders to hedge downside risk, share performance gains, and obtain immediate large‐sum cash payments for investment or consumption. On average, PVF transactions cover 30% of a sample insider's firm‐specific wealth ($22 million), which is substantially larger than a typical open‐market sale. PVFs systematically follow strong firm performance and precede degraded stock and earnings performance. PVFs also precede periods of negative abnormal returns relative to potential alternative investments. The documented association between PVFs and performance declines does not appear to result from the market's response to transaction disclosure, participant self‐selection, or general price reversals. Thus, evidence suggests that insiders use PVFs to diversify firm‐specific holdings in anticipation of performance declines.

Suggested Citation

  • Alan D. Jagolinzer & Steven R. Matsunaga & P. Eric Yeung, 2007. "An Analysis of Insiders' Use of Prepaid Variable Forward Transactions," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(5), pages 1055-1079, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:joares:v:45:y:2007:i:5:p:1055-1079
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2007.00260.x
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    3. Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger & Stulz, René M., 2011. "Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 11-26, January.
    4. Kaplan, Steven N. & Sørensen, Morten & Zakolyukina, Anastasia A., 2022. "What is CEO overconfidence? Evidence from executive assessments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 409-425.
    5. Jongwon Park & Sunyoung Kim & Albert Tsang, 2023. "CEO Personal Hedging and Corporate Social Responsibility," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 182(1), pages 199-221, January.
    6. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Vashishtha, Rahul, 2012. "Executive stock options, differential risk-taking incentives, and firm value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 70-88.
    7. Pandher, Gurupdesh, 2022. "Determinants of Return-maximizing CEO Equity & Cash compensation," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 154-168.
    8. Lee M. Dunham, 2018. "Does a CEO’s hedging ability affect the firm’s capital structure?," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 42(3), pages 615-630, July.
    9. Marie‐Hélène Gagnon & Aurélien Philippot, 2020. "Are Incentive Contract Settlements Nonevents?," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 20(4), pages 983-992, December.
    10. Lee M. Dunham & Sijing Wei & Jiarui (Iris) Zhang, 2023. "Does a CEO’s ability to hedge affect the firm’s payout policy?," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 47(2), pages 303-322, June.
    11. Cziraki, Peter, 2018. "Trading by bank insiders before and during the 2007–2008 financial crisis," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 58-82.
    12. Ronald Anderson & Michael Puleo, 2020. "Insider Share-Pledging and Equity Risk," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 58(1), pages 1-25, August.
    13. Gao, Huasheng, 2010. "Optimal compensation contracts when managers can hedge," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 218-238, August.
    14. KIM, Hyonok & YASUDA, Yukihiro & 安田, 行宏, 2016. "A new approach to identify the economic effects of disclosure: Information content of business risk disclosures in Japanese firms," Working Paper Series G-1-13, Hitotsubashi University Center for Financial Research.
    15. Carr Bettis & John Bizjak & Swaminathan Kalpathy, 2015. "Why Do Insiders Hedge Their Ownership? An Empirical Examination," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 44(3), pages 655-683, September.
    16. Hanlon, Michelle & Heitzman, Shane, 2010. "A review of tax research," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 127-178, December.

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