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Matching Capital and Labor

Author

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  • JONATHAN B. BERK
  • JULES H. van BINSBERGEN
  • BINYING LIU

Abstract

We establish an important role for the firm by studying capital reallocation decisions of mutual fund firms. The firm's decision to reallocate capital among its mutual fund managers adds at least $474,000 a month, which amounts to over 30% of the total value added of the industry. We provide evidence that this additional value added results from the firm's private information about the skill of its managers. The firm captures this value because investors reward the firm following a capital reallocation decision by allocating additional capital to the firm's funds.

Suggested Citation

  • JONATHAN B. BERK & JULES H. van BINSBERGEN & BINYING LIU, 2017. "Matching Capital and Labor," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 72(6), pages 2467-2504, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:72:y:2017:i:6:p:2467-2504
    DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12542
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Charlotte Christiansen & Ran Xing & Yue Xu, 2020. "Origins of Mutual Fund Skill: Market versus Accounting Based Asset Pricing Anomalies," CREATES Research Papers 2020-14, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    2. Charles Cao & Grant Farnsworth & Hong Zhang, 2021. "The Economics of Hedge Fund Startups: Theory and Empirical Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(3), pages 1427-1469, June.
    3. Pástor, Ľuboš & Stambaugh, Robert F. & Taylor, Lucian A., 2015. "Scale and skill in active management," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 23-45.
    4. Beggs, William & DeVault, Luke, 2022. "Mutual fund (sub)advisor connections and crowds," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 231-252.
    5. Nathaniel Light & Ivan Stetsyuk, 2022. "Puzzle solved? A comprehensive analysis of hedge fund-like mutual funds according to the value-added paradigm," Journal of Asset Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 23(3), pages 256-275, May.
    6. Daniel Ferreira & Radoslawa Nikolowa, 2015. "Misallocation of Talent in Competitive Labor Markets," Working Papers 740, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    7. Markus Ibert & Ron Kaniel & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh & Roine Vestman, 2018. "Are Mutual Fund Managers Paid for Investment Skill?," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(2), pages 715-772.
    8. Jakša Cvitanić & Julien Hugonnier, 2022. "Optimal fund menus," Mathematical Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 455-516, April.
    9. Cici, Gjergji & Hendriock, Mario & Kempf, Alexander, 2018. "The impact of labor mobility restrictions on managerial actions: Evidence from the mutual fund industry," CFR Working Papers 18-01, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    10. Zambrana, Rafael & Zapatero, Fernando, 2021. "A tale of two types: Generalists vs. specialists in asset management," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 844-861.
    11. Arpit Gupta & Kunal Sachdeva, 2019. "Skin or Skim? Inside Investment and Hedge Fund Performance," NBER Working Papers 26113, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Barbu, Alexandru & Fricke, Christoph & ,, 2020. "Procyclical Asset Management and Bond Risk Premia," CEPR Discussion Papers 15123, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Cici, Gjergji & Hendriock, Mario & Kempf, Alexander, 2021. "The impact of labor mobility restrictions on managerial actions: Evidence from the mutual fund industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    14. Ibert, Markus, 2023. "What do mutual fund managers’ private portfolios tell us about their skills?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).
    15. Khim, Veasna & Razafitombo, Hery, 2023. "Scale and skills in European active management: Impact of a new regulatory context," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    16. Dayani, Arash & Jannati, Sima, 2022. "Running a mutual fund: Performance and trading behavior of runner managers," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 43-62.
    17. Dong, Feng & Doukas, John A., 2021. "Managerial ability premium factor and fund performance," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    18. Chen, Jean Jinghan & Xie, Li & Zhou, Si, 2020. "Managerial multi-tasking, Team diversity, and mutual fund performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    19. Yue Xu, 2022. "Reallocation of Mutual Fund Managers and Capital Raising Ability," CREATES Research Papers 2022-11, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    20. Zhu, Min, 2018. "Informative fund size, managerial skill, and investor rationality," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 114-134.
    21. Daniel Ferreira & Radoslawa Nikolowa, 2015. "Misallocation of Talent in Competitive Labor Markets," Working Papers 740, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • J01 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics: General
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior

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