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Evolutionary Drift In Preference And Equilibrium Selection

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  • TETSUO YAMAMORI

Abstract

This paper studies the situation where myopic players repeatedly face a society with two actions where their common fitness exhibits economies of scale. Both states in which all players choose the same actions are equilibria. In each period, players adjust their actions based on their preferences, which are in turn shaped by natural selection. The preferences of the players need not match the underlying fitness. When rare mutations are introduced into the evolutionary process, their preferences may drift without affecting equilibrium behaviour. This paper shows that these drifts influence the results of equilibrium selection.

Suggested Citation

  • Tetsuo Yamamori, 2009. "Evolutionary Drift In Preference And Equilibrium Selection," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 362-375, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:60:y:2009:i:3:p:362-375
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2008.00453.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ely, Jeffrey C. & Yilankaya, Okan, 2001. "Nash Equilibrium and the Evolution of Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 255-272, April.
    2. Samuelson, Larry, 2001. "Introduction to the Evolution of Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 225-230, April.
    3. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    4. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
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