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Externality and information asymmetry in the production of local public goods

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  • Myeonghwan Cho

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  • Myeonghwan Cho, 2013. "Externality and information asymmetry in the production of local public goods," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 9(2), pages 177-201, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:9:y:2013:i:2:p:177-201
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Koethenbuerger, Marko, 2008. "Revisiting the "Decentralization Theorem"--On the role of externalities," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 116-122, July.
    2. Amir Ziv, 1993. "Information Sharing in Oligopoly: The Truth-Telling Problem," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(3), pages 455-465, Autumn.
    3. Jeremy Greenwood & R. Preston McAfee, 1991. "Externalities and Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(1), pages 103-121.
    4. Wallace E. Oates & Wallace E. Oates, 2004. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Chapters, in: Environmental Policy and Fiscal Federalism, chapter 22, pages 384-414, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 2003. "Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2611-2637, December.
    6. Ricardo Alonso & Wouter Dessein & Niko Matouschek, 2008. "When Does Coordination Require Centralization?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 145-179, March.
    7. Ricardo Alonso & Wouter Dessein & Niko Matouschek, 2008. "When Does Coordination Require Centralization?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 145-179, March.
    8. Peter Klibanoff & Jonathan Morduch, 1995. "Decentralization, Externalities, and Efficiency," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 62(2), pages 223-247.
    9. Nahum D. Melumad & Toshiyuki Shibano, 1991. "Communication in Settings with No. Transfers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 173-198, Summer.
    10. Rob, Rafael, 1989. "Pollution claim settlements under private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 307-333, April.
    11. Ben Lockwood, 2002. "Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(2), pages 313-337.
    12. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Francisco Silva, 2023. "Should a benevolent government provide public goods if it cannot commit?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 61(3), pages 720-737, July.
    2. Francisco Silva, 2016. "Should the Government Provide Public Goods if it Cannot Commit?," Documentos de Trabajo 477, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    3. Myeonghwan Cho, 2019. "Investor’s Information Sharing with Firms in Oligopoly," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 35, pages 439-469.
    4. Peter Klibanoff & Michel Poitevin, 2022. "A theory of (de)centralization," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(3), pages 417-451, June.

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