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Agri‐environmental Schemes Require Improved Design for Better Outcomes

Author

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  • Chi Nguyen
  • Uwe Latacz‐Lohmann
  • Nick Hanley

Abstract

Advocacy for a shift from an individual farm‐level to a landscape‐level approach in agri‐environmental policy is a focal point in the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy. Such a shift aims to address spatial mismatches between ecological processes and targeted environmental outcomes, and to harness potential ecological gains from spatial coordination. However, there remains limited understanding of how to design effective mechanisms aimed at encouraging coordination among landholders. Do landscape configurations influence the effectiveness of coordination mechanisms? This article aims to assess the effectiveness of alternative coordination mechanisms incorporated in the design of a conservation auction across alternative landscape configurations, that is, in terms of the spatial relationship between some measure of environmental benefit – such as wild bird species diversity – and the profitability of farmland. These mechanisms include landholder‐to‐landholder communication, disclosure of spatial environmental scoring rules, and the Agglomeration Bonus. We used lab experiments to evaluate these options. Our results suggest that there is no panacea for promoting landscape‐level environmental outcomes. Communication proves capable of significantly facilitating coordination, whilst information disclosure policies can serve as an effective coordination mechanism in multiple landscape types. By contrast, the Agglomeration Bonus was only found to effectively promote coordination in a positively correlated landscape type. It leads to lower cost‐effectiveness in all landscape types. Le plaidoyer en faveur du passage d'une approche de l’échelle individuelle à une approche à l’échelle du paysage dans la politique agroenvironnementale est un point central de la réforme de la politique agricole commune. Un tel changement vise à remédier aux inadéquations spatiales entre les processus écologiques et les résultats environnementaux ciblés, et à exploiter les gains écologiques potentiels issus de la coordination spatiale. Cependant, la compréhension de la manière de concevoir des mécanismes efficaces pour encourager la coordination entre les propriétaires fonciers reste limitée. Les configurations paysagères influencent‐elles l'efficacité des mécanismes de coordination? Cet article vise à évaluer l'efficacité des mécanismes de coordination alternatifs incorporés dans la conception d'une vente aux enchères de mesures de conservation à travers des configurations paysagères alternatives, définies en termes de corrélation spatiale entre les avantages environnementaux et les coûts d'opportunité. Ces mécanismes comprennent la communication entre propriétaires fonciers, la divulgation des règles de notation environnementale spatiale et un bonus d'agglomération. Nous avons utilisé des expériences en laboratoire pour évaluer ces options. Nos résultats suggèrent qu'il n'existe pas de panacée pour promouvoir des résultats environnementaux à l’échelle du paysage. La communication s'avère capable de faciliter considérablement la coordination, tandis que les politiques de divulgation d'informations peuvent servir de mécanisme de coordination efficace dans de multiples types de paysages. En revanche, le bonus d'agglomération ne favorise efficacement la coordination que dans un seul type de paysage et conduit à une rentabilité moindre dans tous les types de paysages. Ein Schwerpunkt der Reform der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik ist das Befürworten einer Verlagerung von einem individuellen zu einem landschaftsbezogenen Ansatz in der Agrarumweltpolitik. Eine solche Verlagerung soll räumliche Missverhältnisse zwischen ökologischen Prozessen und angestrebten Umweltergebnissen angehen und potenzielle ökologische Vorteile einer räumlichen Koordinierung nutzen. Es gibt jedoch kaum Erkenntnisse darüber, wie Mechanismen zur Förderung der Koordinierung zwischen Landbesitzenden wirksam gestaltet werden können. Beeinflusst die Konfiguration der Landschaft die Wirksamkeit der Koordinierungsmechanismen? Das Ziel dieses Artikels ist es, die Wirksamkeit alternativer Koordinationsmechanismen zu bewerten, die in das Design einer Naturschutzauktion über verschiedene Landschaftskonfigurationen hinweg integriert wurden, definiert hinsichtlich der räumlichen Korrelation zwischen Umweltnutzen und Opportunitätskosten. Diese Mechanismen umfassen die Kommunikation zwischen den Landbesitzenden, die Offenlegung der Bestimmungen der räumlichen Umweltbewertung und den Agglomerationsbonus. Wir haben diese Optionen in Laborexperimenten bewertet. Unsere Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass es kein Allheilmittel zur Förderung von Umweltergebnissen auf Landschaftsebene gibt. Kommunikation erweist sich als geeignet, die Koordinierung erheblich zu erleichtern, während eine Politik der Offenlegung von Informationen als wirksamer Koordinierungsmechanismus bei verschiedenen Landschaftstypen dienen kann. Im Gegensatz dazu wurde festgestellt, dass der Agglomerationsbonus die Koordinierung nur bei einem einzigen Landschaftstyp wirksam fördert. Er führt bei allen Landschaftstypen zu einer geringeren Kosteneffizienz.

Suggested Citation

  • Chi Nguyen & Uwe Latacz‐Lohmann & Nick Hanley, 2024. "Agri‐environmental Schemes Require Improved Design for Better Outcomes," EuroChoices, The Agricultural Economics Society, vol. 23(3), pages 14-21, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:eurcho:v:23:y:2024:i:3:p:14-21
    DOI: 10.1111/1746-692X.12441
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Steven Schilizzi & Uwe Latacz-Lohmann, 2007. "Assessing the Performance of Conservation Auctions: An Experimental Study," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 83(4), pages 497-515.
    2. Schilizzi, Steven & Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe, 2007. "Assessing the performance of conservation auctions: an experimental study," 2007 Conference (51st), February 13-16, 2007, Queenstown, New Zealand 10436, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
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    8. Chi Nguyen & Uwe Latacz‐Lohmann & Nick Hanley, 2024. "Landscape‐level determinants of the performance of an agglomeration bonus in conservation auctions," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(2), pages 592-616, June.
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    1. Nguyen, Chi & Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe & Hanley, Nick & Iftekhar, Sayed, 2025. "Conservation auctions for landscape-scale environmental management: Does spatial configuration matter for economic and ecological outcomes?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 230(C).
    2. Thomas Rellensmann & Stefanie Engel & Jens Rommel & Fabian Thomas, 2026. "Collective Contracts as a Risk‐Sharing Mechanism for Result‐Based Agri‐Environmental Payments: Experimental Evidence," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 77(2), pages 597-614, June.

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