IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/eufman/v1y1995i3p223-240.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The role of defensive strategies and ownership structure of target firms: Evidence from UK hostile takeover bids

Author

Listed:
  • P. S. Sudarsanam

Abstract

The outcome of a hostile takeover bid hinges on an interplay of the defensive strategies of targets and the offensive strategies of bidders. This study examines the determinants of outcome for a sample of 205 hostile bids for UK public company targets over the period 1983–1989. the impact of a number of defensive strategies adopted by the targets, their ownership structure which could aid or hinder the deployment of those strategies, and the method of payment selected by bidders is investigated using multivariate logit methodology. the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers in the UK and its influence on the choice of defensive and offensive strategies is described. the study finds outcome in hostile bids in the UK is significantly influenced by the use of certain defensive strategies, the presence of large institutional shareholders in targets, the size of targets and the method of payment chosen by the bidder. the results of this study are useful in devising effective strategies to frustrate or prosecute hostile bids.

Suggested Citation

  • P. S. Sudarsanam, 1995. "The role of defensive strategies and ownership structure of target firms: Evidence from UK hostile takeover bids," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 1(3), pages 223-240, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:eufman:v:1:y:1995:i:3:p:223-240
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-036X.1995.tb00018.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-036X.1995.tb00018.x
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1468-036X.1995.tb00018.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Agrawal, Anup & Mandelker, Gershon N, 1987. "Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decision s," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 42(4), pages 823-837, September.
    2. Joy, O. Maurice & Tollefson, John O., 1975. "On the Financial Applications of Discriminant Analysis," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(5), pages 723-739, December.
    3. Cotter, James F. & Zenner, Marc, 1994. "How managerial wealth affects the tender offer process," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 63-97, February.
    4. Peterson, David R. & Peterson, Pamela P., 1991. "The medium of exchange in mergers and acquisitions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 383-405, April.
    5. Fishman, Michael J, 1989. " Preemptive Bidding and the Role of the Medium of Exchange in Acquisitions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 44(1), pages 41-57, March.
    6. Walkling, Ralph A., 1985. "Predicting Tender Offer Success: A Logistic Analysis," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(4), pages 461-478, December.
    7. Hansen, Robert G, 1987. "A Theory for the Choice of Exchange Medium in Mergers and Acquisitions," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 60(1), pages 75-95, January.
    8. Brickley, James A. & Lease, Ronald C. & Smith, Clifford Jr., 1988. "Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 267-291, January.
    9. Pound, John, 1988. "Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 237-265, January.
    10. Mikkelson, Wayne H. & Partch, M. Megan, 1989. "Managers' voting rights and corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 263-290, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Henry, Darren, 2004. "Corporate governance and ownership structure of target companies and the outcome of takeovers," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 419-444, September.
    2. Niamh Brennan & S. J. Gray, 1998. "Voluntary Disclosure of Profit Forecasts: Factors Influencing Information Disclosed during UK Takeover Bids," Open Access publications 10197/3889, Research Repository, University College Dublin.
    3. Caiazza, Stefano & Pozzolo, Alberto Franco, 2016. "The determinants of failed takeovers in the banking sector: Deal or country characteristics?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(S), pages 92-103.
    4. Chenxi Zhou & Jinhong Xie & Qi Wang, 2016. "Failure to Complete Cross-Border M&As: “To” vs. “From” Emerging Markets," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 47(9), pages 1077-1105, December.
    5. Olivier Bertrand & Marie-Ann Betschinger & Alexander Settles, 2016. "The relevance of political affinity for the initial acquisition premium in cross-border acquisitions," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(10), pages 2071-2091, October.
    6. Marcia Annisette & Marta Macias, 2002. "The Bank of the State and the state of the Bank: Annual Accounts of the Banco de Espana, 1872-94," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(2), pages 357-376.
    7. Ali Ataullah & Ian Davidson & Hang Le, 2010. "Large Shareholders, the Board of Directors and the Allocation of Cash Proceeds from Corporate Asset Sell†offs," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 16(2), pages 271-295, March.
    8. Kieran James & Janice How & Peter Verhoeven, 2008. "Did the goodwill accounting standard impose material economic consequences on Australian acquirers?," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 48(4), pages 625-647, December.
    9. Zhang, Jianhong & Zhou, Chaohong & Ebbers, Haico, 2011. "Completion of Chinese overseas acquisitions: Institutional perspectives and evidence," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 226-238, April.
    10. Emmanuelle Negre & Isabelle Martinez, 2012. "Une Analyse Lexicale Des Communiques De Presse Volontaires Emis Lors Des Opa/Ope : Quels Profils De Diffusion ?," Post-Print hal-00936567, HAL.
    11. Noel O'Sullivan & Pauline Wong, 1998. "Internal versus External Control: An Analysis of Board Composition and Ownership in UK Takeovers," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 2(1), pages 17-35, March.
    12. Jianhong Zhang & Haico Ebbers, 2010. "Why Half of China’s Overseas Acquisitions Could Not Be Completed," Journal of Current Chinese Affairs - China aktuell, Institute of Asian Studies, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, vol. 39(2), pages 101-131.
    13. Seema Miglani & Kamran Ahmed & Darren Henry, 2020. "Corporate governance and turnaround: Evidence from Australia," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 45(4), pages 549-578, November.
    14. Isabelle Martinez & Emmanuelle Negre, 2011. "Les déterminants de la communication volontaire des entreprises cibles d'OPA/OPE : le cas des synergies," Post-Print hal-00650551, HAL.
    15. Lee, Kangbok & Joo, Sunghoon & Baik, Hyeoncheol & Han, Sumin & In, Joonhwan, 2020. "Unbalanced data, type II error, and nonlinearity in predicting M&A failure," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 271-287.
    16. Caiazza, Stefano & Pozzolo, Alberto Franco, 2014. "The determinants of abandoned M&As in the banking sector," Economics & Statistics Discussion Papers esdp14074, University of Molise, Department of Economics.
    17. Noel O'Sullivan & Pauline Wong, 1999. "Board composition, ownership structure and hostile takeovers: some UK evidence," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(2), pages 139-155.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Cotter, James F. & Shivdasani, Anil & Zenner, Marc, 1997. "Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 195-218, February.
    2. Loderer, Claudio & Martin, Kenneth, 1997. "Executive stock ownership and performance Tracking faint traces," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 223-255, August.
    3. Noel O'Sullivan & Pauline Wong, 1999. "Board composition, ownership structure and hostile takeovers: some UK evidence," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(2), pages 139-155.
    4. Carline, Nicholas F. & Linn, Scott C. & Yadav, Pradeep K., 2014. "Corporate governance and the nature of takeover resistance," CFR Working Papers 14-01, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    5. Noel O'Sullivan & Pauline Wong, 1998. "Internal versus External Control: An Analysis of Board Composition and Ownership in UK Takeovers," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 2(1), pages 17-35, March.
    6. Basnet, Anup & Davis, Frederick & Walker, Thomas & Zhao, Kun, 2021. "The effect of securities class action lawsuits on mergers and acquisitions," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 48(C).
    7. Denis, David J. & Denis, Diane K. & Sarin, Atulya, 1997. "Ownership structure and top executive turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 193-221, August.
    8. Niamh Brennan, 1999. "Voluntary Disclosure of Profit Forecasts by Target Companies in Takeover Bids," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(7‐8), pages 883-917, September.
    9. Saeyoung Chang & Michael Hertzel, 2004. "Equity Ownership and Firm Value: Evidence from Targeted Stock Repurchases," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 39(3), pages 389-407, August.
    10. Bates, Thomas W. & Lemmon, Michael L., 2003. "Breaking up is hard to do? An analysis of termination fee provisions and merger outcomes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 469-504, September.
    11. Sokolyk, Tatyana, 2011. "The effects of antitakeover provisions on acquisition targets," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 612-627, June.
    12. Jean-Jacques Hamon, 2001. "La répartition des droits de vote, leur exercice et l’efficacité économique," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 63(3), pages 175-209.
    13. St-Pierre, Josee & Gagnon, Jean-Marie & Saint-Pierre, Jacques, 1996. "Concentration of voting rights and board resistance to takeover bids," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 45-73, December.
    14. Bhagat, Sanjai & Dong, Ming & Hirshleifer, David & Noah, Robert, 2005. "Do tender offers create value? New methods and evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 3-60, April.
    15. Eckbo, B. Espen, 2009. "Bidding strategies and takeover premiums: A review," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 149-178, February.
    16. Lily Qiu, 2004. "Which Institutional Investors Monitor? Evidence from Acquisition Activity," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2497, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Jun 2006.
    17. Lili Qiu, 2004. "Which Institutional Investors Monitor? Evidence from Acquisition Activity," Working Papers 2004-21, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    18. Qiu, Buhui & Trapkov, Svetoslav & Yakoub, Fadi, 2014. "Do target CEOs trade premiums for personal benefits?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 23-41.
    19. Chenxi Zhou & Jinhong Xie & Qi Wang, 2016. "Failure to Complete Cross-Border M&As: “To” vs. “From” Emerging Markets," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 47(9), pages 1077-1105, December.
    20. Renneboog, L.D.R. & Szilagyi, P.G., 2009. "Shareholder Activism through the Proxy Process," Other publications TiSEM cc25d736-2965-4511-b100-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:eufman:v:1:y:1995:i:3:p:223-240. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/efmaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.