IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ehsrev/v63y2010i4p865-890.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Regulation, rent‐seeking, and the Glorious Revolution in the English Atlantic economy

Author

Listed:
  • NUALA ZAHEDIEH

Abstract

The rapid rise of England's colonial commerce in the late seventeenth century expanded the nation's resource base, stimulated efficiency improvements across the economy, and was important for long‐term growth. However, close examination of the interests at play in England's Atlantic world does not support the Whiggish view that the Glorious Revolution played a benign role in this story. In the decades after the Restoration, the cases of the Royal African Company and the Spanish slave trade in Jamaica are used to show that the competition between Crown and Parliament for control of regulation constrained interest groups on either side in their efforts to capture the profits of empire. Stuart ‘tyranny’ was not able to damage growth and relatively competitive (and peaceful) conditions underpinned very rapid increases in colonial output and trade. The resolution of the rules of the Atlantic game in 1689 allowed a consolidated state better to manipulate and manage the imperial economy in its own interests. More secure rent‐seeking enterprises and expensive wars damaged growth and European rivals began a process of catch‐up. The Glorious Revolution was not sufficient to permanently halt economic development but it was sufficient to slow progress towards industrial revolution.

Suggested Citation

  • Nuala Zahedieh, 2010. "Regulation, rent‐seeking, and the Glorious Revolution in the English Atlantic economy," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 63(4), pages 865-890, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ehsrev:v:63:y:2010:i:4:p:865-890
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0289.2009.00505.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0289.2009.00505.x
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1468-0289.2009.00505.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Peter Temin & Hans‐Joachim Voth, 2008. "Private borrowing during the financial revolution: Hoare's Bank and its customers, 1702–241," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 61(3), pages 541-564, August.
    2. Gauci, Perry, 2001. "The Politics of Trade: The Overseas Merchant in State and Society, 1660-1720," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199241934.
    3. Daron Acemoglu, 2006. "A Simple Model of Inefficient Institutions," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(4), pages 515-546, December.
    4. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 803-832, December.
    5. Scott, William Robert, 1912. "Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies to 1720," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, volume 1, number scott1912a.
    6. Baumol, William J., 1996. "Entrepreneurship: Productive, unproductive, and destructive," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 3-22, January.
    7. Scott, William Robert, 1912. "Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies to 1720," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, volume 3, number scott1912c.
    8. Carlos Ann M., 1994. "Bonding and the Agency Problem: Evidence from the Royal African Company, 1672-1691," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 313-335, July.
    9. Price, Jacob M. & Clemens, Paul G. E., 1987. "A Revolution of Scale in Overseas Trade: British Firms in the Chesapeake Trade, 1675–1775," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 47(1), pages 1-43, March.
    10. Scott, William Robert, 1912. "Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies to 1720," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, volume 2, number scott1912b.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dan Bogart, 2016. "The East Indian Monopoly and the Transition from Limited Access in England, 1600–1813," NBER Chapters, in: Organizations, Civil Society, and the Roots of Development, pages 23-49, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Rosolino A. Candela & Vincent J. Geloso, 2018. "The lightship in economics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(3), pages 479-506, September.
    3. D'Maris Coffman & Judy Z. Stephenson & Nathan Sussman, 2022. "Financing the rebuilding of the City of London after the Great Fire of 1666," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 75(4), pages 1120-1150, November.
    4. Dan Bogart, 2014. "Governance after the Glorious Revolution: evidence on the enforcement of property rights in Britain’s transport sector, 1690-1750," Working Papers 14024, Economic History Society.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Andrianova, Svetlana & Demetriades, Panicos & Xu, Chenggang, 2011. "Political Economy Origins of Financial Markets in Europe and Asia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 686-699, May.
    2. Dan Bogart, 2016. "The East Indian Monopoly and the Transition from Limited Access in England, 1600–1813," NBER Chapters, in: Organizations, Civil Society, and the Roots of Development, pages 23-49, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Yang, Der-Yuan, 2008. "On the elements and practices of monitoring," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 654-666, March.
    4. Gregory Price & Warren Whatley, 2021. "Did profitable slave trading enable the expansion of empire?: The Asiento de Negros, the South Sea Company and the financial revolution in Great Britain," Cliometrica, Springer;Cliometric Society (Association Francaise de Cliométrie), vol. 15(3), pages 675-718, September.
    5. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Oscar Gelderblom & Joost Jonker & Enrico C. Perotti, 2017. "The Emergence of the Corporate Form," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(2), pages 193-236.
    6. Eric Hilt, 2014. "History of American Corporate Governance: Law, Institutions, and Politics," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 1-21, December.
    7. Victor Zarnowitz, 1997. "Business Cycles Observed and Assessed: Why and How They Matter," NBER Working Papers 6230, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Christopher Noke, 2000. "No value in par: a history of the no par value debate in the United Kingdom," Accounting History Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(1), pages 13-36.
    9. Whelan, Shane, 2007. "Valuing Ireland's Pension System," Quarterly Economic Commentary: Special Articles, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), vol. 2007(2-Summer), pages 55-80.
    10. Ann M. Carlos & Erin Fletcher & Larry Neal, 2015. "Share portfolios in the early years of financial capitalism: London, 1690–1730," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 68(2), pages 574-599, May.
    11. Bryer, R. A., 2000. "The history of accounting and the transition to capitalism in England. Part two: evidence," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 25(4-5), pages 327-381, May.
    12. Frehen, Rik G.P. & Goetzmann, William N. & Geert Rouwenhorst, K., 2013. "New evidence on the first financial bubble," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 585-607.
    13. Peter Temin & Hans-Joachim Voth, 2004. "Riding the South Sea Bubble," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1654-1668, December.
    14. Mariana Pargendler & Henry Hansmann, 2013. "A new view of shareholder voting in the nineteenth century: evidence from Brazil, England and France," Business History, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 55(4), pages 585-600, June.
    15. Christine Macleod, 1986. "The 1690s Patents Boom: Invention or Stock-Jobbing?," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 39(4), pages 549-571, November.
    16. Paolo Maggioni, 2011. "The introduction of limited liability in nineteenth century England," Openloc Working Papers 1116, Public policies and local development.
    17. Hilt, Eric, 2008. "When did Ownership Separate from Control? Corporate Governance in the Early Nineteenth Century," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(3), pages 645-685, September.
    18. Teresa John & Lemma Senbet & Anant Sundaram & Peter Woodward, 2005. "Limited Liability and Market Power," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 215-231, November.
    19. Robert F. Bruner & Scott C. Miller, 2020. "The First Modern Financial Crises: The South Sea and Mississippi Bubbles in Historical Perspective," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 32(4), pages 17-33, December.
    20. Christopher Nobes, 2015. "Accounting for capital: the evolution of an idea," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(4), pages 413-441, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ehsrev:v:63:y:2010:i:4:p:865-890. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ehsukea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.