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Shareholder voting rights in early American corporations

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  • Eric Hilt

Abstract

In early American corporations, the power of large shareholders was frequently limited by voting rules that partially disenfranchised them. In particular, stock held in an individual's name was granted a number of votes per share that decreased with the number of shares held. Using data from the corporations created in New York up to 1825, this paper analyses the use of these 'graduated' voting rights. Consistent with the view that they were intended to help small investors protect themselves against the predations of controlling shareholders, the data indicate that graduated voting rights were imposed in industries that attracted small investments from ordinary households. The results highlight the importance of concerns over the controlling influence of large shareholders in early corporate governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Hilt, 2013. "Shareholder voting rights in early American corporations," Business History, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 55(4), pages 620-635, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:bushst:v:55:y:2013:i:4:p:620-635
    DOI: 10.1080/00076791.2012.741975
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    1. Scott, William Robert, 1912. "Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies to 1720," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, volume 1, number scott1912a.
    2. Scott, William Robert, 1912. "Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies to 1720," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, volume 3, number scott1912c.
    3. Scott, William Robert, 1912. "Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies to 1720," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, volume 2, number scott1912b.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Calomiris, Charles W. & Carlson, Mark, 2016. "Corporate governance and risk management at unprotected banks: National banks in the 1890s," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(3), pages 512-532.
    3. Yaron Azrieli, 2018. "The price of ‘one person, one vote’," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(2), pages 353-385, February.
    4. Eric Hilt, 2014. "History of American Corporate Governance: Law, Institutions, and Politics," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 1-21, December.
    5. Coyle, Christopher & Musacchio, Aldo & Turner, John D., 2019. "Law and Finance in Britain c.1900," QBS Working Paper Series 2019/11, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's Business School.
    6. Emilie Bonhoure, 2021. "An Original Solution to Agency Issues Among PreWWI Paris-Listed Firms : The Statutory Rule of Profit Allocation," PSE Working Papers halshs-03107869, HAL.
    7. Eric Hilt, 2016. "Corporation Law and the Shift toward Open Access in the Antebellum United States," NBER Chapters, in: Organizations, Civil Society, and the Roots of Development, pages 147-177, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Coyle, Christopher & Musacchio, Aldo & Turner, John D., 2019. "Law and finance in Britain c.1900," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(3), pages 267-293, December.
    9. Rachelle Belinga & Blanche Segrestin, 2018. "Principals and stewards? An exploration of the role of institutional investors in corporate governance," Post-Print hal-01791931, HAL.

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