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The Impact of Merger Activity on Executive Pay in the United Kingdom

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  • SOURAFEL GIRMA
  • STEVE THOMPSON
  • PETER W. WRIGHT

Abstract

We examine the impact of mergers and acquisitions on the remuneration of CEOs in the UK from 1981 to 1996. We find that CEO pay is not strongly related to company performance. In contrast, increases in firm size do have a significant impact. There is also evidence that acquisitions offer CEOs the scope to influence their pay positively. We also note however that CEOs engaging in ‘wealth‐reducing’ acquisitions experience significantly lower remuneration than their counterparts whose deals meet with market approval. This result suggests that shareholder–principals have at least some success in penalizing managers for unwarranted, empire‐building, mergers.

Suggested Citation

  • Sourafel Girma & Steve Thompson & Peter W. Wright, 2006. "The Impact of Merger Activity on Executive Pay in the United Kingdom," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 73(290), pages 321-339, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:73:y:2006:i:290:p:321-339
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1648-0335.2006.00513.x
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    1. repec:fth:prinin:404 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Sendhil Mullainathan & Marianne Bertrand, 1998. "Executive Compensation and Incentives: The Impact of Takeover Legislation," Working papers 98-20, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    3. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 1998. "Executive Compensation and Incentives: The Impact of Takeover Legislation," Working Papers 783, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    4. A Cosh & P Guest, 2001. "The Long-Run Performance of Hostile Takeovers: UK Evidence," Working Papers wp215, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
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    1. Birhanu, Addis Gedefaw & Geiler, Philipp & Renneboog, Luc & Zhao, Yang, 2021. "Acquisition experience and director remuneration," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    2. Chandra S. Mishra, 2020. "Frequent acquirers and management compensation," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(5), pages 661-694, July.
    3. Paul M. Guest, 2009. "The Impact of Mergers and Acquisitions on Executive Pay in the United Kingdom," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 76(301), pages 149-175, February.
    4. Papa, Gianluca & Speciale, Biagio, 2011. "Financial leverage and managerial compensation: Evidence from the UK," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 36-46, March.
    5. Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2015. "Merger efficiency and managerial incentives," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 51-63.
    6. Amewu, Godfred & Alagidede, Paul, 2019. "Mergers and executive compensation changes: Evidence from African markets," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 397-419.
    7. Khalil Jebran & Shihua Chen & Wanying Cai, 2022. "Excess of everything is bad: CEO greed and corporate policies," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 59(4), pages 1577-1607, November.
    8. Ozkan, Neslihan, 2012. "Do CEOs gain more in foreign acquisitions than domestic acquisitions?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 1122-1138.
    9. Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2014. "Merger Performance and Managerial Incentives," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 02/2014, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    10. Margarita Carvalho & João Cerejeira, 2019. "Mergers and Acquisitions and wage effects in the Portuguese banking sector," NIPE Working Papers 07/2019, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    11. Swarnodeep Homroy, 2014. "Pay increase may not be a strong incentive for undertaking acquisitions," Working Papers 66910750, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    12. Jongmoo Jay Choi & Omer F. Genc & Ming Ju, 2020. "Is an M&A self‐dealing? Evidence on international and domestic acquisitions and CEO compensation," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(9-10), pages 1290-1315, October.
    13. Hristos Doucouliagos & Janto Haman & T.D. Stanley, 2012. "Pay for Performance and Corporate Governance Reform," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 670-703, July.
    14. Birhanu, Addis & Geiler, Philipp & Renneboog, Luc & Zhao, Yang, 2021. "Acquisition experience and director remuneration," Other publications TiSEM 6c1d41ae-5e2a-4868-b1af-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    15. Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2013. "Bad Mergers Revisited: An Incentive Perspective," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79914, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    16. Agyei-Boapeah, Henry & Ntim, Collins G. & Fosu, Samuel, 2019. "Governance structures and the compensation of powerful corporate leaders in financial firms during M&As," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 37(C).

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