IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ecinqu/v53y2015i1p388-405.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Gone Fishing! Reported Sickness Absenteeism And The Weather

Author

Listed:
  • Jingye Shi
  • Mikal Skuterud

Abstract

A fundamental challenge in informing employer–employee agency problems is measuring employee shirking activity. We identify the propensity of employees to misreport health in order to exploit favorable weather by linking Canadian weather data and survey data on short‐term spells of sickness absenteeism among indoor workers during the non‐winter months. The results point to a clear tendency for reported sickness absenteeism to rise with the recreational quality of the weather. Comparing across workers suggests larger marginal weather effects where shirking costs are higher, which we show is consistent with employees' marginal utility of outdoor leisure increasing in the interaction of their health and weather quality. We discuss the implications of our findings for flexible vacation policies and survey respondents' trust in the confidentiality guarantees of statistical agencies. (JEL D82, I10, J22)

Suggested Citation

  • Jingye Shi & Mikal Skuterud, 2015. "Gone Fishing! Reported Sickness Absenteeism And The Weather," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 53(1), pages 388-405, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:53:y:2015:i:1:p:388-405
    DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12109
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12109
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/ecin.12109?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Depken II, Craig A. & Redmount, Esther & Snow, Arthur, 2001. "Shirking and the choice of technology: a theory of production inefficiency with an empirical application," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(4), pages 383-402, April.
    2. MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1998. "Motivation and Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 388-411, June.
    3. Lazear, Edward P, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1261-1284, December.
    4. Randall S. Cerveny & Robert C. Balling, 1998. "Erratum: Weekly cycles of air pollutants, precipitation and tropical cyclones in the coastal NW Atlantic region," Nature, Nature, vol. 395(6700), pages 405-405, September.
    5. Bradley, Steve & Green, Colin & Leeves, Gareth, 2007. "Worker absence and shirking: Evidence from matched teacher-school data," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 319-334, June.
    6. Randall S. Cerveny & Robert C. Balling, 1998. "Weekly cycles of air pollutants, precipitation and tropical cyclones in the coastal NW Atlantic region," Nature, Nature, vol. 394(6693), pages 561-563, August.
    7. Arai, Mahmood & Thoursie, Peter Skogman, 2005. "Incentives and selection in cyclical absenteeism," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 269-280, April.
    8. Marie Connolly, 2008. "Here Comes the Rain Again: Weather and the Intertemporal Substitution of Leisure," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 73-100.
    9. Paringer, Lynn, 1983. "Women and Absenteeism: Health or Economics?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(2), pages 123-127, May.
    10. Monojit Chatterji & Colin J. Tilley, 2002. "Sickness, absenteeism, presenteeism, and sick pay," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(4), pages 669-687, October.
    11. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
    12. Baker, George & Holmstrom, Bengt, 1995. "Internal Labor Markets: Too Many Theories, Too Few Facts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 255-259, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Good weather and absenteeism
      by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2012-12-06 22:01:00

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Liu, Haoming & Salvo, Alberto, 2017. "Severe Air Pollution and School Absences: Longitudinal Data on Expatriates in North China," IZA Discussion Papers 11134, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. René Böheim & Thomas Leoni, 2020. "Absenteeism on bridging days," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(20), pages 1667-1671, November.
    3. Roberto Cellini & Tiziana Cuccia, 2019. "Weather conditions and museum attendance: a case-study from Sicily," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 154(3), pages 511-527, June.
    4. Laszlo Goerke, 2017. "Sick pay reforms and health status in a unionised labour market," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 64(2), pages 115-142, May.
    5. Thomas Leoni & René Böheim, 2018. "Fehlzeitenreport 2018. Krankheits- und unfallbedingte Fehlzeiten in Österreich – Präsentismus und Absentismus," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 61487, Juni.
    6. Pablo Blanchard & Gabriel Burdín & Andrés Dean, 2023. "Property Rights and Effort Supply," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 23-01, Instituto de Economía - IECON.
    7. Harold E. Cuffe, 2018. "Rain and museum attendance: Are daily data fine enough?," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 42(2), pages 213-241, May.
    8. Laszlo Goerke & Sabrina Jeworrek & Markus Pannenberg, 2015. "Trade union membership and paid vacation in Germany," IZA Journal of Labor Economics, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 4(1), pages 1-26, December.
    9. Ciccia, Diego & Distefano, Rosaria & Reito, Francesco, 2022. "The mismatch between potential and actual shirking in a model of bureaucracy," MPRA Paper 115452, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Pierre Brochu & Till Gross & Christopher Worswick, 2020. "Temporary foreign workers and firms: Theory and Canadian evidence," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(3), pages 871-915, August.
    11. Laszlo Goerke & Sabrina Jeworrek, 2021. "Paid vacation use: The role of works councils," Economic and Industrial Democracy, Department of Economic History, Uppsala University, Sweden, vol. 42(3), pages 473-503, August.
    12. Philippe Kabore & Nicholas Rivers, 2023. "Manufacturing output and extreme temperature: Evidence from Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(1), pages 191-224, February.
    13. Laszlo Goerke, 2016. "Sick Pay Reforms and Health Status in a Unionised Labour Market," IAAEG Discussion Papers until 2011 201604, Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).
    14. Liu, Haoming & Salvo, Alberto, 2018. "Severe air pollution and child absences when schools and parents respond," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 300-330.
    15. Tamar Kricheli Katz & Tali Regev & Shay Lavie & Haggai Porat & Ronen Avraham, 2020. "Those who tan and those who don’t: A natural experiment on colorism," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(7), pages 1-14, July.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Sebastien Menard, 2021. "Optimal sickness benefits in a principal–agent model," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(1), pages 5-33, July.
    2. De Paola, Maria, 2010. "Absenteeism and peer interaction effects: Evidence from an Italian Public Institute," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 420-428, June.
    3. Pouliakas, Konstantinos & Theodossiou, Ioannis, 2010. "An Inquiry Into The Theory, Causes And Consequences Of Monitoring Indicators Of Health And Safety At Work," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-120, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    4. Armin Falk & David Huffman & W. Bentley Macleod, 2015. "Institutions and Contract Enforcement," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(3), pages 571-590.
    5. Marte Rønning, 2012. "The effect of working conditions on teachers'sickness absence," Discussion Papers 684, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    6. Michele Battisti & Giovanna Vallanti, 2013. "Flexible Wage Contracts, Temporary Jobs, and Firm Performance: Evidence From Italian Firms," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(3), pages 737-764, July.
    7. Christian Pfeifer, 2014. "Base Salaries, Bonus Payments, and Work Absence among Managers in a German Company," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 61(5), pages 523-536, November.
    8. Mohamed Ali Ben Halima & Thierry Debrand & Camille Regaert, 2012. "Sick Leaves: Understanding Disparities Between French Departments," Working Papers DT50, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics, revised Oct 2012.
    9. Mohamed Ali Ben Halima & Thierry Debrand & Camille Regaert, 2011. "Arrêts maladie : comprendre les disparités départementales," Working Papers DT39, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics, revised Feb 2011.
    10. Lloyd Ulman, 1992. "Why Should Human Resource Managers Pay High Wages?," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 30(2), pages 177-212, June.
    11. Edward P. Lazear, 1995. "Personnel Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121883, December.
    12. Wang, Cheng, 2011. "Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 74-110, January.
    13. Boris HirschBy & Daniel S. J. Lechmann & Claus Schnabel, 2017. "Coming to work while sick: an economic theory of presenteeism with an application to German data," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(4), pages 1010-1031.
    14. Pierre Brochu & Till Gross & Christopher Worswick, 2020. "Temporary foreign workers and firms: Theory and Canadian evidence," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(3), pages 871-915, August.
    15. Rauh, Joshua D. & Stefanescu, Irina & Zeldes, Stephen P., 2020. "Cost saving and the freezing of corporate pension plans," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    16. W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006. "Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 1730, CESifo.
    17. William Bentley MacLeod & Daniel Parent, 1998. "Job Characteristics and the Form of Compensation," CIRANO Working Papers 98s-08, CIRANO.
    18. Akiomi Kitagawa, 2014. "Wage Profiles and Income Inequality among Identical Workers: A Simple Formalization," TERG Discussion Papers 314, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University.
    19. Vincenzo SPIEZIA, 2002. "The greying population: A wasted human capital or just a social liability?," International Labour Review, International Labour Organization, vol. 141(1-2), pages 71-113, March.
    20. Luke Petach & Dustin Rumbaugh, 2021. "Are You Ready for Some Football? Estimating the Effect of American Football Season on Labor Supply in the United States," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 22(8), pages 893-920, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:53:y:2015:i:1:p:388-405. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/weaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.