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Responsible politics means resource constraints, transparency and the separation of money from political power

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  • Volodymyr Vysochansky

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  • Volodymyr Vysochansky, 2026. "Responsible politics means resource constraints, transparency and the separation of money from political power," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 346-356, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecaffa:v:46:y:2026:i:2:p:346-356
    DOI: 10.1111/ecaf.70037
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Alesina, Alberto & Perotti, Roberto, 1996. "Fiscal Discipline and the Budget Process," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 401-407, May.
    3. repec:eme:aaaj00:aaaj-04-2014-1661 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-162, May.
    5. David Heald & Ron Hodges, 2015. "Will “austerity” be a critical juncture in European public sector financial reporting?," Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 28(6), pages 993-1015, August.
    6. Michael McLeay & Amar Radia & Ryland Thomas, 2014. "Money creation in the modern economy," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England, vol. 54(1), pages 14-27.
    7. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1995. "Fiscal Expansions and Fiscal Adjustments in OECD Countries," NBER Working Papers 5214, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Alt, James E. & Lassen, David Dreyer, 2006. "Fiscal transparency, political parties, and debt in OECD countries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(6), pages 1403-1439, August.
    9. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    10. Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 1984. "Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Brian Griffiths & Geoffrey E. Wood (ed.), Monetarism in the United Kingdom, pages 15-41, Palgrave Macmillan.
    11. Volodymyr Vysochansky, 2025. "Transforming the monetary system," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(3), pages 497-508, October.
    12. Leeson, Peter T., 2011. "Government, clubs, and constitutions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 301-308.
    13. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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