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Decreasing Campus Smoking With Punishments And Social Pressures

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Listed:
  • Kaytlynn Clemons
  • David B. Johnson
  • Amy Kiger
  • Janice Putnam

Abstract

This paper reports the effectiveness of a Midwest state university's “100% tobacco‐free” policy. The policy used social pressures and punishments to incentivize tobacco users to no longer consume tobacco on campus. The policy had three distinct periods (Pre‐Promotion, Post‐Promotion, and Post‐Policy). Social pressures and punishments were introduced during the Post‐Promotion and Post‐Policy periods, respectively. Changes in cigarette consumption were inferred by counting the number of cigarette butts found at various locations on campus. A statistically significant decrease in the number of cigarette butts was observed during the Post‐Promotion period. After the initial drop, tobacco use remained constant for the remainder of the period. An additional decrease was observed once punishments were introduced in the third period. However, the number of cigarette butts observed on campus remained significantly above zero. Further research is needed to understand how smokers substitute across time, location, and tobacco products after the implementation of similar policies. (JEL I11, C99, I12)

Suggested Citation

  • Kaytlynn Clemons & David B. Johnson & Amy Kiger & Janice Putnam, 2018. "Decreasing Campus Smoking With Punishments And Social Pressures," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(4), pages 629-643, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:36:y:2018:i:4:p:629-643
    DOI: 10.1111/coep.12283
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Martina Mullin & Shane Allwright & David McGrath & Catherine B. Hayes, 2023. "Use of a Living Lab Approach to Implement a Smoke-Free Campus Policy," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 20(7), pages 1-20, March.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • C99 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Other
    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior

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