IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/coecpo/v27y2009i4p539-554.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Politically Feasible, Revenue Sufficient, And Economically Efficient Municipal Water Rates

Author

Listed:
  • DARWIN C. HALL

Abstract

Water rates are designed to meet multiple objectives, typically resulting in trade‐offs among the objectives of economic efficiency, revenue sufficiency, and related revenue stability. Standard theory of natural monopoly is extended here to explain why long‐run marginal cost (LMC) can be greater than both average cost and short‐run marginal cost (SMC) for municipal water utilities. The distinctions between “benign monopoly rates” and “marginal cost rate design” favor LMC over SMC as the basis for economically efficient rate design. Taking into account conservation investments by consumers, SMC rates are economically inefficient, except during temporary shortages. The City of Los Angeles adopted economically efficient, revenue sufficient, and revenue‐stable water rates at the end of a prolonged drought. After the drought ended, Los Angeles (LA) modified the rate design, making the design politically feasible during normal rainfall years. Unique features in the LA rate design determine the allocation of consumer surplus among ratepayers, making the rate design politically feasible by sharing efficiency gains among customer classes. Revenue sufficiency and stability features in the rate design minimize adverse job effects on water utility management, reducing the frequency of rate hearings with an increasing block design. (JEL L51, L95, Q25, Q51)

Suggested Citation

  • Darwin C. Hall, 2009. "Politically Feasible, Revenue Sufficient, And Economically Efficient Municipal Water Rates," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 27(4), pages 539-554, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:27:y:2009:i:4:p:539-554
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.2009.00164.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.2009.00164.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1465-7287.2009.00164.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Garcia, Serge & Reynaud, Arnaud, 2004. "Estimating the benefits of efficient water pricing in France," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-25, March.
    2. Hall, Darwin C. & Behl, Richard J., 2006. "Integrating economic analysis and the science of climate instability," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 442-465, May.
    3. Darwin C. Hall, 2009. "Prescriptive Public Choice: Application To Residential Water Rate Reform," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 27(4), pages 555-565, October.
    4. Paul L. Joskow, 1976. "Contributions to the Theory of Marginal Cost Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 197-206, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Francisco Silva Pinto & Rui Cunha Marques, 2016. "Tariff Suitability Framework for Water Supply Services," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 30(6), pages 2037-2053, April.
    2. Pinto, Francisco Silva & Marques, Rui Cuhna, 2015. "Tariff recommendations: A Panacea for the Portuguese water sector?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 36-44.
    3. Liang Lu & David Deller & Morten Hviid, 2018. "Price and Behavioural Signals to Encourage Household Water Conservation in Temperate Climates," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2018-01, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    4. Kenneth A. Baerenklau & Kurt A. Schwabe & Ariel Dinar, 2014. "The Residential Water Demand Effect of Increasing Block Rate Water Budgets," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 90(4), pages 683-699.
    5. Yiğit Sağlam, 2019. "Welfare Implications of Water Scarcity: Higher Prices of Desalination," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 73(4), pages 995-1022, August.
    6. Darwin C. Hall, 2009. "Prescriptive Public Choice: Application To Residential Water Rate Reform," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 27(4), pages 555-565, October.
    7. Heather Hodges & Colin Kuehl & Sarah E. Anderson & Phillip J. Ehret & Cameron Brick, 2020. "How Managers Can Reduce Household Water Use Through Communication: A Field Experiment," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 39(4), pages 1076-1099, September.
    8. Fuente, David, 2019. "The design and evaluation of water tariffs: A systematic review," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    9. Liang Lu & David Deller & Morten Hviid, 2019. "Price and Behavioural Signals to Encourage Household Water Conservation: Implications for the UK," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 33(2), pages 475-491, January.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Norman, Catherine S. & DECANIO, STEPHEN J & Fan, Lin, 2007. "Opportunities and Challenges for the 20th Anniversary of the Montréal Protocol," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt3t90g0gr, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
    2. Christopher Müller, 2015. "Welfare Effects of Water Pricing in Germany," Water Economics and Policy (WEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 1(04), pages 1-25, December.
    3. Jiang, Kai & Yan, Xiaohe & Liu, Nian & Wang, Peng, 2022. "Energy trade-offs in coupled ICM and electricity market under dynamic carbon emission intensity," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 260(C).
    4. Fischer, Ronald & Serra, Pablo, 2003. "Energy prices in the presence of plant indivisibilities," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 303-314, July.
    5. Lemoine, Derek M. & Traeger, Christian P., 2010. "Tipping Points and Ambiguity in the Economics of Climate Change," CUDARE Working Papers 98127, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    6. REYNAUD Arnaud, 2006. "Assessing the impact of public regulation and private participation on water affordability for poor households: An empirical investigation of the French case," LERNA Working Papers 06.09.202, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
    7. Simshauser, Paul, 2022. "Rooftop solar PV and the peak load problem in the NEM's Queensland region," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    8. Xiaojia Bao, 2016. "Water, Electricity and Weather Variability in Rural Northern China," Working Papers 2014-07-02, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
    9. Paul Simshauser and David Downer, 2016. "On the Inequity of Flat-rate Electricity Tariffs," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3).
    10. Fuente, David, 2019. "The design and evaluation of water tariffs: A systematic review," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    11. Neuhoff, Karsten & De Vries, Laurens, 2004. "Insufficient incentives for investment in electricity generations," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 253-267, December.
    12. Mark Hoffmann & Andrew Worthington & Helen Higgs, 2006. "Urban water demand with fixed volumetric charging in a large municipality: the case of Brisbane, Australia ," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 50(3), pages 347-359, September.
    13. Daniel Adelman & Canan Uçkun, 2019. "Dynamic Electricity Pricing to Smart Homes," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 67(6), pages 1520-1542, November.
    14. Henrique Monteiro, 2010. "Residential Water Demand in Portugal: checking for efficiency-based justifications for increasing block tariffs," Working Papers Series 1 ercwp0110, ISCTE-IUL, Business Research Unit (BRU-IUL).
    15. Joskow, Paul L., 2008. "Capacity payments in imperfect electricity markets: Need and design," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 159-170, September.
    16. Simshauser, Paul, 2018. "Price discrimination and the modes of failure in deregulated retail electricity markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 54-70.
    17. Joan Calzada, 2007. "Capacity-based versus time-based access charges in telecommunications," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 153-172, October.
    18. Henrique Monteiro, 2005. "Water Pricing Models: a survey," Others 0510002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Reynaud, Arnaud & Thomas, Alban, 2013. "Firm's profitability and regulation in water and network industries: An empirical analysis," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 48-58.
    20. Mosácula, Celia & Chaves-Ávila, José Pablo & Reneses, Javier, 2019. "Reviewing the design of natural gas network charges considering regulatory principles as guiding criteria in the context of the increasing interrelation of energy carriers," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 545-557.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L95 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Gas Utilities; Pipelines; Water Utilities
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
    • Q51 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Valuation of Environmental Effects

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:27:y:2009:i:4:p:539-554. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/weaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.