IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/coecpo/v13y1995i2p16-25.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Profit Sharing And Employee Ownership: Policy Implications

Author

Listed:
  • DANIEL J. B. MITCHELL

Abstract

Various arguments extol public encouragement of profit sharing and Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs). Generally, advocates of public intervention cite externalities (market failure), provision of merit goods, or social transformation as bases for their arguments. To the extent that profit sharing and ESOPs increase productivity or reduce employer costs, no case exists for public intervention, since such advantages are internalized. Although Congress views retirement saving as a merit good, deferred profit sharing and ESOPs are no more deserving of public subsidy on that basis than are other forms of saving, such as pensions. Finally, the notion that ESOPs promote a social transformation by redistributing equity is untenable. One can make a case for government efforts to spread data and information about these plans. The potential macro stabilizing effects of profit sharing—but not ESOPs—provide a rationale for a tax subsidy to the former.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel J. B. Mitchell, 1995. "Profit Sharing And Employee Ownership: Policy Implications," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 13(2), pages 16-25, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:13:y:1995:i:2:p:16-25
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1995.tb00739.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.1995.tb00739.x
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1465-7287.1995.tb00739.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Freeman, Richard B. & Weitzman, Martin L., 1987. "Bonuses and employment in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 168-194, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jyh‐Bang Jou & Tan (Charlene) Lee, 2021. "Uncertainty, hiring and firing costs, and the determinants of profit‐sharing rules," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(1), pages 185-197, January.
    2. Roger T. Kaufman & Raymond Russell, 1995. "GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR PROFIT SHARING, GAINSHARING, ESOPs, AND TQM," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 13(2), pages 38-48, April.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Richard B. Freeman, 2007. "Labor Market Institutions Around the World," NBER Working Papers 13242, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Morton, Peter J., 1998. "Annual bonuses, employment and productivity change in Taiwan's manufacturing sector," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 481-507, December.
    3. Hijzen, Alexander & Kambayashi, Ryo & Teruyama, Hiroshi & Genda, Yuji, 2015. "The Japanese labour market during the global financial crisis and the role of non-standard work: A micro perspective," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 260-281.
    4. Dhillon, Amrita & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 2001. "Profit-sharing, bertrand competition and monopoly unions : a note," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 612, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    5. Katharine G. Abraham & Susan N. Houseman, 1993. "Job Security and Work Force Adjustment: How Different are U.S. and Japanese Practices?," Book chapters authored by Upjohn Institute researchers, in: Christopher F. Buechtemann (ed.),Employment Security and Labor Market Behavior: Interdisciplinary Approaches and International Evidence, pages 180-199, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    6. Muto Ichiro & Shintani Kohei, 2020. "An empirical study on the New Keynesian wage Phillips curve: Japan and the US," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-17, January.
    7. Richard B. Freeman, 2003. "Changing the Guard: The Rise of the United States to Peak Capitalist Economy," NBER Chapters, in: Labor Markets and Firm Benefit Policies in Japan and the United States, pages 19-38, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Ang, James S. & Constand, Richard L., 1997. "Compensation and performance: the case of Japanese managers and directors," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 275-304, December.
    9. Maciej Kozłowski, 2020. "Unconventional incentive schemes in tourism enterprises, does it make sense?," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 54(5), pages 1613-1632, December.
    10. Bridgman, Benjamin, 2015. "Competition, work rules and productivity," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 136-149.
    11. Thomas Cornelissen & John S. Heywood & Uwe Jirjahn, 2010. "Profit Sharing and Reciprocity: Theory and Survey Evidence," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 292, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
    12. Ramon Moreno, 1992. "Japan's recessions," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue mar6.
    13. Kenjiro Hori, 2006. "Profit-Sharing as the Optimal Wage Contract," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0601, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
    14. Chang, Juin-jen & Lai, Ching-chong & Lin, Chung-cheng, 2003. "Profit sharing, worker effort, and double-sided moral hazard in an efficiency wage model," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 75-93, March.
    15. Lichtenberg, Frank R., 1995. "Labour market institutions, liquidity constraints, and macroeconomic stability," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 145-154, September.
    16. Gary R. Saxonhouse, 1993. "Economic Growth and Trade Relations: Japanese Performance in Long-Term Perspective," NBER Chapters, in: Trade and Protectionism, pages 149-182, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Kimura, Takeshi & Ueda, Kazuo, 2001. "Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 50-67, March.
    18. Antal, Miklós, 2014. "Green goals and full employment: Are they compatible?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 276-286.
    19. Kandel, Eugene & Pearson, Neil D., 2001. "Flexibility versus Commitment in Personnel Management," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 515-556, December.
    20. Linda A. Bell & David Neumark, 1991. "Lump-Sums, Profit Sharing, and the Labor Costs in the Union Sector," NBER Working Papers 3630, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:13:y:1995:i:2:p:16-25. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/weaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.