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Holding cash for corruption? Evidence from China's anti‐corruption campaign

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  • Yulin Chen
  • Changyun Wang
  • Yang Yi
  • Jianyu Zeng

Abstract

Exploiting China's anti‐corruption campaign in 2012 as a quasi‐natural experiment, we find that firms with higher prior entertainment and travel costs (ETC), a proxy for corruption, decrease cash holdings more because of the campaign. We further observe a greater decline in cash values for more corrupt firms. Moreover, the baseline pattern is more pronounced in financially constrained, better‐governed, and private enterprises. We also rule out possible confounders concerning firms' financing conditions and investment decisions. Overall, the evidence favours the liquidity hypothesis that firms demand less cash as they anticipate fewer corrupt opportunities in the business environment in the post‐campaign era.

Suggested Citation

  • Yulin Chen & Changyun Wang & Yang Yi & Jianyu Zeng, 2025. "Holding cash for corruption? Evidence from China's anti‐corruption campaign," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 65(1), pages 581-619, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:acctfi:v:65:y:2025:i:1:p:581-619
    DOI: 10.1111/acfi.13341
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