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Private equity bids in Australia: an exploratory study

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  • Larelle Chapple
  • Peter M. Clarkson
  • Jesse J. King

Abstract

In this study, we provide an insight into how private equity players choose their targets and the bid arrangements they prefer. We test our expectations of the unique features of private equity targets using a sample of 23 listed private equity target firms during 2001–2007. We find, relative to a benchmark sample of 81 corporate targets matched by year and industry, the private equity target firms to be larger, more profitable, use their assets more efficiently, more highly levered and have greater cash flow. Multivariate testing indicates that private equity targets have relatively greater financial slack, greater financial stability, greater free cash flow and lower measurable growth prospects. All conclusions are found to be robust to a control sample of 502 takeover bids during 2001–2007.

Suggested Citation

  • Larelle Chapple & Peter M. Clarkson & Jesse J. King, 2010. "Private equity bids in Australia: an exploratory study," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 50(1), pages 79-102, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:acctfi:v:50:y:2010:i:1:p:79-102
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-629X.2009.00323.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Subhrendu Rath & Mamunur Rashid, 2016. "Undervaluation and private equity takeovers," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 41(4), pages 735-759, November.
    2. Sheeba Kapil & Vrinda Rawal, 2023. "Systematic Literature Review of Private Equity Determinants: Status, Evidence and Open Issues," Vision, , vol. 27(5), pages 567-581, November.
    3. Sarah Osborne, 2020. "Abnormal returns and asymmetric information surrounding strategic and financial acquisitions," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 60(4), pages 3991-4030, December.
    4. Guy Schofield, 2020. "Evidence of governance arbitrage by private equity sponsors," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 60(S1), pages 971-1005, April.
    5. Peter M Clarkson & Shams Pathan & Andrew Tellam, 2016. "Do private equity target firms exhibit less effectual governance structures?," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 41(2), pages 244-270, May.
    6. Sarah Osborne & Dean Katselas & Larelle Chapple, 2012. "The preferences of private equity investors in selecting target acquisitions: An international investigation," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 37(3), pages 361-389, December.
    7. Martin Bugeja & Kosta Sinelnikov, 2012. "Public versus private takeovers of Australian stock exchange listed targets," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 37(3), pages 391-414, December.
    8. Brindusa�Maria BUZILA (Mocanu), 2016. "The Cee Companies, Attractive Deals For Leveraged Buyout Transactions?," Journal of Public Administration, Finance and Law, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, vol. 9(9), pages 131-144, June.
    9. Rudina Degjoni & Ilirjana Loxha, 2020. "Albania’s Plan: Response to COVID-19," European Journal of Economics and Business Studies Articles, Revistia Research and Publishing, vol. 6, ejes_v6_i.

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