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Strengthening and Streamlining Bank Capital Regulation

Author

Listed:
  • Robin Greenwood

    (Harvard Business School)

  • Samuel G. Hanson

    (Harvard Business School)

  • Jeremy C. Stein

    (Harvard University)

  • Adi Sunderam

    (Harvard Business School)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Robin Greenwood & Samuel G. Hanson & Jeremy C. Stein & Adi Sunderam, 2017. "Strengthening and Streamlining Bank Capital Regulation," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 48(2 (Fall)), pages 479-565.
    • Handle: RePEc:bin:bpeajo:v:48:y:2017:i:2017-02:p:479-565
    as

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    File URL: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/greenwoodtextfa17bpea.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Flannery, Mark & Hirtle, Beverly & Kovner, Anna, 2017. "Evaluating the information in the federal reserve stress tests," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 1-18.
    2. William R. Cline, 2017. "The Right Balance for Banks: Theory and Evidence on Optimal Capital Requirements," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 7212, January.
    3. Gorton, Gary B., 2010. "Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199734153.
    4. Gordy, Michael B., 2003. "A risk-factor model foundation for ratings-based bank capital rules," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 199-232, July.
    5. Samuel G. Hanson & Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, 2011. "A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 25(1), pages 3-28, Winter.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Cimon, David & Garriott, Corey, 2019. "Banking regulation and market making," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    2. Amadxarif, Zahid & Brookes, James & Garbarino, Nicola & Patel, Rajan & Walczak, Eryk, 2019. "The language of rules: textual complexity in banking reforms," Bank of England working papers 834, Bank of England.
    3. Wang, Olivier, 2020. "Banks, low interest rates, and monetary policy transmission," Working Paper Series 2492, European Central Bank.
    4. Anna Kovner & Peter Van Tassel, 2018. "Evaluating regulatory reform: banks’ cost of capital and lending," Staff Reports 854, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    5. Farmer, J Doyne & Kleinnijenhuis, Alissa M & Nahai-Williamson, Paul & Wetzer, Thom, 2020. "Foundations of system-wide financial stress testing with heterogeneous institutions," Bank of England working papers 861, Bank of England.

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