IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bdu/ojjhrl/v3y2018i2p1-22id646.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Influence Of Formal Structures On Sustainable Performance Contracting Of Employees In Chartered Public Universities In Kenya

Author

Listed:
  • Joshua Enane Amwayi
  • Prof. Mike Amuhaya Iravo
  • Prof. Romanus Odhiambo
  • Dr. Victor Ladan Lutsili

Abstract

Purpose: The study at investigating the influence of formal structures on sustainable performance contracting of employees in chartered public universities in Kenya Methods: The study adopted a descriptive research design. This study adopted a positivist research philosophy. The population of the study comprised of all the staff members in public chartered universities in Kenya. For this study, target population was 27,054. This figure comprised of various staff at the universities who included; the Academic, Administrative and Technical staff. Various strata were identified from the areas of academic specialization of schools or faculties. The sample size was 384 respondents. Primary data was collected by use of one main structured questionnaire that captured the various variables of the study. Both descriptive and inferential statistics were used. Results: Formal structures as an element of institutional framework influenced sustainable performance contracting of employees in chartered public universities in Kenya through providing the policy framework as well as rules and regulations for the development and implementation of the performance contracts. Unique contribution to theory, practice and policy: The study recommends that the management of the chartered public universities in Kenya should conduct regular review of the institutions' formal structures in order to ensure that they remain up to date; are reflective of the changes happening within the institutions and also enhance the employees' performance. Keywords: Formal structures, sustainable performance contracting, employees, chartered public universities

Suggested Citation

  • Joshua Enane Amwayi & Prof. Mike Amuhaya Iravo & Prof. Romanus Odhiambo & Dr. Victor Ladan Lutsili, 2018. "Influence Of Formal Structures On Sustainable Performance Contracting Of Employees In Chartered Public Universities In Kenya," Journal of Human Resource and Leadership, IPRJB, vol. 3(2), pages 1-22.
  • Handle: RePEc:bdu:ojjhrl:v:3:y:2018:i:2:p:1-22:id:646
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.iprjb.org/journals/index.php/JHRL/article/view/646
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. F P Wheeler, 2001. "A Bayesian approach to service level performance monitoring in supplier, provider relationships," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Palgrave Macmillan;The OR Society, vol. 52(4), pages 383-390, April.
    2. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
    3. R. Duane Ireland & Jeffrey G. Covin & Donald F. Kuratko, 2009. "Conceptualizing Corporate Entrepreneurship Strategy," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 33(1), pages 19-46, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Tobias Kretschmer & Phanish Puranam, 2008. "Integration Through Incentives Within Differentiated Organizations," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(6), pages 860-875, December.
    2. Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2016. "Technology, team production and incentives," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 91-94.
    3. Swen Nadkarni & Reinhard Prügl, 2021. "Digital transformation: a review, synthesis and opportunities for future research," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, vol. 71(2), pages 233-341, April.
    4. Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, 1994. "The Division of Labor, Coordination Costs, and Knowledge," NBER Chapters, in: Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to Education, Third Edition, pages 299-322, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Jie Ren & Jar-Der Luo & Ke Rong, 2020. "How Do Venture Capitals Build Up Syndication Ecosystems for Sustainable Development?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(11), pages 1-14, May.
    6. Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, 1999. "Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(6), pages 1999-2043, December.
    7. SeEun Jung & Radu Vranceanu, 2017. "Gender Interaction in Teams: Experimental Evidence on Performance and Punishment Behavior," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 33, pages 95-126.
    8. Rahman, Aminur & Sawada, Yasuyuki, 2012. "Can donor coordination solve the aid proliferation problem?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 609-612.
    9. Matthew Ellman, 2006. "Specificity Revisited: The Role of Cross-Investments," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(1), pages 234-257, April.
    10. Bogetoft, Peter & Nielsen, Kurt, 2003. "Yardstick Based Procurement Design In Natural Resource Management," 2003 Annual Meeting, August 16-22, 2003, Durban, South Africa 25910, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    11. Gastón Llanes & Stefano Trento, 2012. "Patent policy, patent pools, and the accumulation of claims in sequential innovation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 50(3), pages 703-725, August.
    12. Roussey, Ludivine & Soubeyran, Raphael, 2018. "Overburdened judges," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 21-32.
    13. Imhof, Lorens & Kräkel, Matthias, 2014. "Bonus pools and the informativeness principle," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 180-191.
    14. Bevia Carmen & Corchón Luis C, 2006. "Rational Sabotage in Cooperative Production with Heterogeneous Agents," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-29, November.
    15. Carlos Jiménez-Angueira & Nathan Stuart, 2015. "Relative performance evaluation, pay-for-luck, and double-dipping in CEO compensation," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 44(4), pages 701-732, May.
    16. Carolyn J. Heinrich & Gerald Marschke, 2010. "Incentives and their dynamics in public sector performance management systems," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(1), pages 183-208.
    17. repec:vuw:vuwscr:19122 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Xin Qu & Majella Percy & Fang Hu & Jenny Stewart, 2022. "Can CEO equity‐based compensation limit investment‐related agency problems?," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(2), pages 2579-2614, June.
    19. Christoph Constantin Niemann & Petra Dickel & Gordon Eckardt, 2020. "The interplay of corporate entrepreneurship, environmental orientation, and performance in clean‐tech firms—A double‐edged sword," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 180-196, January.
    20. van der Heijden, Eline & Potters, Jan & Sefton, Martin, 2009. "Hierarchy and opportunism in teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 39-50, January.
    21. Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 2000. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(2), pages 359-378.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bdu:ojjhrl:v:3:y:2018:i:2:p:1-22:id:646. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chief Editor (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://iprjb.org/journals/index.php/JHRL/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.