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Influence of Human Resource Management on Performance Contracting Results in Local Authorities in Kenya

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Listed:
  • Elliubs Kimura Mwangi

  • Prof. Roselyn W. Gakure

  • Dr. Robert Arasa

  • Dr. Anthony Waititu

Abstract

Purpose: The purpose of the study was to determine the influence of human resource management on performance contracting results in local authorities in Kenya.Methodology: The study used a Correlational research design. The target population comprised of 41867 employees. This study used stratified random sampling to select a sample of 328 from the175 Local Authorities in Kenya as per the Ministry of Local Government. Questionnaires were used to collect data from local authority employees. Descriptive and inferential statistics was used to conduct analysis.Results: The study found out that human resource management practices significantly affect the effectiveness of performance contracting.Unique contribution to theory, practice and policy: The study recommended that independence of the human resource department be supported. The recommendations maybe critical to the successful running of the county governments which takes over the services performed by local authorities.

Suggested Citation

  • Elliubs Kimura Mwangi & Prof. Roselyn W. Gakure & Dr. Robert Arasa & Dr. Anthony Waititu, 2017. "Influence of Human Resource Management on Performance Contracting Results in Local Authorities in Kenya," Journal of Human Resource and Leadership, IPRJB, vol. 2(5), pages 20-33.
    • Handle: RePEc:bdu:ojjhrl:v:2:y:2017:i:5:p:20-33:id:350
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lings, Ian N., 2004. "Internal market orientation: Construct and consequences," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 57(4), pages 405-413, April.
    2. George Baker, 2002. "Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 37(4), pages 728-751.
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